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PREFACE
The following thesis is the product of
of research and \v!'i tingo.

O'~'Jer

two years

In preparing a. thesis on the

proposed international ocean regime one particularly frustrating problem is encountered.

There 1.s a. lack of a.ny

comprehensive work of respectable quality on the topic.

Only

a small number of short articles of good quality that offer a
thoughtful analysis of the subject ure ttvaila.ble.

As a

e-------

~
cc

result, an extensive amount of original research was required
to prepare this thesis.

It is difficult, 1.f not improper, to na.n1e any
individual as an ex.pert on q1e ocean regi.me is sue e

The topic

cuts across many different disciplines and has no single
leading student.

There are, however, some 01.1.tstMding

individuals in areas related to the ocean regime issue •
.M·altese Ambassador to the United Nations Arvid Pardo, must
be recognized for his foresight :i.n focusing the world's
,.attention on the need for an ocean reg:t.me.

In 1967, the

Ambassador from Malta, introduced to the United Nations
General Assembly a resolution which called for,

j.nt.~r.. ~;ill'

a

recognition of the sea-bed as the ttcommon heritage of me.nkind.n

It was also Pardo's initiative that helped to

establish the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee.
For information on actual and potential ocean
resources Jor.l!l L. Mero is the authoritative source.
iii

E=

Although

iv
Mere's original works are now somewhat dated, they continue
to be the best available.
pertinent materials.)

(Consult the Bibliography for

For an introspective political

analysis of the problems presented by an ocean regime Ann

~

-

:=- -------:-.:: ____ _
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Hollick and Evan Laurd, who both have articles in the Hinter
~--

1972-73 issue of Foreign Poj.ic_x, give a realistic view which
was

very helpful in formulating some of the 1.deas that follow.

Seyom Brown and Larry Fabian, in the January, 197it. lssue of
Fore!gn Af.:f.air;!, have outlined the major issues to be faced
at this year 1 s Conference on the Law of the Sea to be held :tn
Caracas, Venezuela.
The efforts of Elisabeth Mann Borgese should also be
noted.

On<3 of the most prolific authors on the regime topic,

Dr .. Borgese he.s helped to b:d,ng about construct:i.ve dialogue

on the regime issue at an international level.

\'lorking with

the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Dr.
Borgese assisted in making the 1970 Pacem in Mar·ibus
Convocation possible.

The Convocation was held in Malta and

assembled 260 political leaders, industrialists, scientists
and fishery experts in an attempt to atimulate political
action.

One·outcome of the Convocation is a collection of

articles by various authorities on topics related to the
regime.

The book, Pacem in

~1aribus,

is edited by Borgese and
~--

was very helpful in several different areas related to this

thesis.
It should be noted, however, that all the sources.
which are mentioned above, while excellent in their purpose,
are too brief to provide a comprehensive ane.lysls of the

~=

~--

v

regime issue.

Such a.n analysis is, to my knowledge, yet to

be·published.

The' bulk of information and understanding of

the regime issue is to be found in United Nation's documents,

G

[

--
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resolutions, Secretariat studies and draft proposals

c-'

>'--------

submitted by member states.
~--

The subject area of this thesis is the proposed
international sea regime.

The regime in this context refers
;'

\

to the pr•oposed international organization to control the
resources of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction..

Regime in the above context ha.s a specific

meaning and should not be confused with the more general
·meaning of a regime of the sea.

In the more general sense

R

regime of the sea would encompass the entire la1-1 of the sea ..
Such a broad scope is n,ot intended, therefore no treatment of
., .

fishing rights, limitation of' nu.clear" a:rms, extensive oil
deposits et cetera are attempted except as they specifically
relate to the proposed ocean regime and its jurisdiction.
Special thanks must be extended to sevel"al groups for
. the kind assistance they rendered to me.

In pru:•ticular I

wish to express my gratitude to the General Commj_ttee of the
XXIII Session of the Model Unl ted Nat ions of the Far lvest for
their invaluable contributions.

Parts of this thesis reflect

some of the work of the General Comrr1ittee.

The library

staffs at Stanford University and the University of
California at Santa Barbara have earned my appreciation and
thanks for their skillf,ul assistance.
contains one of the best collection
related topics in the world.

The UCSB library
of materials on ocea."l-

Likewise, the United Nations

~--
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vi
depository at Stanford Uni.versity was an indispensible aid.
In addition, the library at the University of the Pacific
also offered every assistance possible despite limited

[
---

resource materials on the regime topic.
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CHAPTER I
f-.:---

INTRODUCTION

..

..---=---------

For centuries nations of the world have used the
oceans in a dual, nearly paradoxical way •... The seas have
tied nations together providing a media for communi.cation,
transit, and trade.

Conversely, the oceans. have also served

as a buffer between continents and nations.

Thus, the
~

oceans have brought nations together while also keeping them
apart.

~

----

-

---

Currently,.rapid technological developments threaten

to convert the oceans into .. a, battleground as nations grapple
for tho living and non-living resources of the ocean depths.
The problem of establishing a regime to contx•ol the
resources ·O.f the sea. is not unlike other in ternat:i.onal concerns in the. general sense.

Thls problem c.ontains two dynamic

conflicts; fix•st is the struggle betl"leen man and his environment~

and second, is the struggle.among nations and among

men.

Too often when man seems clpse to harmonizing with his

environment the clash between nations disrupts that harmony.
Currently, progress toward institutingan international
regime to

dis·~ri bute

ocean resources has been becalmed by

the stalemate of counterbalBl"lcing national interests.
The resources of the sea comprise a vast reservolr
of 111ealth hez•etofore unreachable due to the lack of necessary
technology.,

In mineral weal"l.;h alone (to say nothing of the

vast off ... shotte

pet1~o1eum

z•ese:r•ves), the sea. offers an .
1

---------

2

impressive list of resources.

Manganese nodules contain

enough copper, manganese, nickel, and cobalt to satisfy. the
world's need at current levels for thousands of years.

The

technological .capacity to exploit these-resources is rapidly
developing •. The danger lies in an ocean ttgold rush" among
developed nations to secure this wealth.

Such a race could

easily escalate into international conflicts, even war.

~==
~-~
.......

-~-~-.~
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In

addition, ocean resources, suddenly reachable due to a
technological breakthrough, would flood existing

wo1~ld

markets, depressing prices-of leading minerals by.as much as

----

50 percent. For many developing countries, such as those

,,

~-

~=I

whose gross national product

(G.N~P.)

depends heavily on

land-based mineral exploitation, uncontrolled ocean mineral
production would spell.economic. disaster&· Such a situation
could only serve-to widen the existing gap between rich and
poor nations of the world..

The developing countries do not

have, and are unlikely to develop, the necessary technology
to exploit non-living ocean resources.
To avoid possible escalation of conflicts over sea '
resources and to prevent the expansion of the gap between
rich and poor nations, an ocean regime is clearly needed in
the interests of world peace and stability.

However, such

long-term values have relatively little affect on nations
who have vital, short-term economic stakes in ocean reserves.
The developed and the developing, the coastal and the noncoastal nations of the world, all want to maximlze their
share of available maritime wealth.

As a result the conflicts

of interest have created the current stalemate.

3
As already mentioned, this situation is an example of'
the intersecting struggles betvJeen man and environment, and
the conflicts among nations.

In this regard the pattern is

similar to other problems in international relations.

But
,.,-----

in another sense it is altogether tmique.

Never before has

-----

~~

there been an international organization designed to allocate
ocean resources.

Consider the significance of an interna-

tional body regulating the flow of resources to nations who
may depend upon those raw materials for economic survlval or
who may demand ocean reserves to aver•t a potential energy

~

r;

crisis.

--

In light of this extensive responslbility, it seems

premature to express optimism about a rapid agreement by
nations on a meaningful regime of extensive powers.
also seem futile to look for operational models for

It would
~n

ocean

regime among existlng international functional agencies.

If

and when a regime is established, it will require a structure
that can maintain the flexibility to adjt1st to rapidly
changing political realitieso
Finally then, we must ask where the solution is to be
found.

How, in light of confllcting short-term national

interests can the long-term inte:r•e·st of world stability and
peace be

served~

The solution, it is the author's thesis,

will rest upon a political compromise of short-term intel.. ests
to accz·ue the advantage of the long-term need for peace and
stability.

~--

In short, in order to maintain peace for ourselves

and for posterity, we are required to somehow align, through
'
"--- ----

tradeoffs and compromise, short-term interests with long-term
goals.

The ptu•pose and theme of this paper is to analyze the

"

various means of achieving this alignment.

To accomplish

this end, a thorough analysis of the sea-bed ,controversy is
required.

The intent. is to gain some insight into the issues

in thehope that a better understanding of thfe problem will
aid in the effort toward its solution.

In pursuit of this

~
'--"-~~-------

Part I,

goal the following organizational approach is taken.

"Environment and Background," studies the con:text in which
the sea-bed issue exists and the historical r.oots fi•om ;.1hich
it sprang.

Chapter II covers the relevant hi:storica.l develop··

ments which bear on the subject.

Chapter III 11

11

0cean

--------

t2

Resources, n is vital to a:n understanding of the proposal to
establish an ocean regime •. · This. chapter

di~cusses

the extent

a.nd availability of ocean-wealth ...... who stands to gain, who
to lose from a sea regime.
Part II, nPolitics," is an inquiry :tnto the political
aspects of the .ocean r.egime dilemma.

This section attempts

to study both theoretical and practical approaches surrounding
the sea-bed crisis •.. Chapter IV examines some differing ·
theoretical viewpoints on the sea regime conflict.

Chapter

V of this section elaborates on the specific international
conflicts related to the sea-bed issue.
The final section, Part III, focuses
proposals for the sea regime.

on specific

It presents a critical

analysis of several key draft stat_utes.

In making this

examination the chapters of this- section are divi.ded along a
structural-functional pattern.

Chapter VI discusses various
5-----

structural suggestions for the regime.

Chapter VII deals

with the possible functions and powers that the regime might

exercise.
Before· plunging into the text that follows, it may be
instructive, in light of the alignrnent.sought between shortterm interests and long-term goals, to ponder a pertinent

l---;----

r-------- --

statement by an adroit politician of the past:

~~

r...-.<---·-----

Few can be induced to labor. exclusively for
posterity; and none will do it enthusiastically.
Posterlty has· done nothing for us; and theorize on
as we may, practically we shall do very little for it,
unless we are made to think t-le are at the se.rne ti.me
doing something for ourselves. 1
Abraham Lincoln
----]]
-

~-

l

u. s. President (Nixon), "Offshore·Minera.l
Resources:. A Challenge and· an Opportunity," Ex~
of the President .( 1969), p ... 1. This repo1•t cites a quotation
of Fresfdent Abi?aham Lincoln.

--------
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PART I

ENVIRONMENT AND BACKGROUND

--------

~--

--
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CHAPTER II
'---'------

TliE HISTORICAL MOVEMENT TO\vARD ESTABLISHING

A NEW OCEAN REGIME
I

The primary objective of Chapter II is to outline the
significant event,s that have led to the· present proposals for

It is also hoped that this

an international ocean regime.

historical information will help to provide some insight into
the i-ntricate international problems currently obstructing
the establishment of a mean.ingful sea-bed authority.
This section is organized chronologically beginning
l'Jith. the

T~ume.n

Proclamation of 19!t.5, continuing through

. discu.ssions of the 1958 and 1960 United Nations Conferences
on the I.aw of the Sea$ and finally analyzing related events
and resolu.tions in past United Nations General Assernbly
sessions from 1967 (22nd Session} to the present.
The source of the modern problem of possession of the
continental.shelf can be directly traced to the Truman
.

Proclamation of 28 September 1945.

1

By

asserting national

sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the United
States, Truman ushered in a new era and created considerable
concern for the adequacy of the traditional law of the sea.
1

u. s. President (Truman), nPolicy of the United
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bod of the Continental Shelf," Proclamation· 2667,
~dera~-~~!st~r-~ (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1945}; p. 1230J.
7

----------

~

;:;---
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8,

The fact that the .first agenda of the Intel'national
Law Commission (1949) included the regime of the high seas
and the regime of the territorial sea, among topics which it

----

considered. both necessary and feasible, shows this concern.

-

---

-

Throughout the next five years the Commission prepared
articles on its stated topics.

At the request of the General

Assembly the Commission, in 1954, began to collect the
articles which it had adopted concernlng the hi.gh seas, the
tel.. ritoria.l sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf,
and the conservation of the living resources of the sea.

-----

~

The report of the Com111ission was presented dw:•ing the
11th Session (1956) of the General Assembly.

It contained

seventy-three draft. ar-ticles covering the territorial sea;
the high seas,. fishing,_ the contiguous zone, and the continental shelf .... The meticulous work of. the commission was not in
vain for on February 21, 1957 the General Assembly decided to
convene an international conference to examine the law of the
sea, taking account not only of the legal, but also the techc•
nical, biological, economic., and poll tical aspects of the
problem.

The results of the Conference were to be embodied

in ono or more international conventions.
~feren~

In 1958, the first United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea met in Geneva, Switzerland from February
April 27.

24

to

Eighty-six states were represented, one of the

larges.t group of sovereign· states which had ever gathered for
·any purpose up to that t:tme.

The Conference divided its work

9

into five main committees;· the,'l'erritorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, the High Seas and the General Regime, the
High Seas Fishing and Conservation of Living Resou.rces 1 the

t::_;

g_ _
L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Continental Shelf, and the Question of Free Access to the Sea

~==----------===

r-,
<.....:;~-~-·----

of Land-locked States.
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
I

was successful in that it adopted four international conventions of major importance to the law of nations.

However, the

Conference .failed to provide the lnternational community with
a precise definition of the continental shelf, a failure that

,,
~

the·com.munity has had to live·with ever.since.

The definiti.on

of.fered by the Conference lies .. in Article 1 of the "Convention
on the Continental Shelf.u

This article .defines the limits of

national jurisdiction. over the sea-bed ··largely on the basis of
exploitability. 2 Thus, limits under the nconvention on the
Continental Shelf" are expandable as technological capabilities improve.

~-

From the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, the statement on the Law of the Continental Shelf as
outlined in Article 1 was extremely vague.

It has been inter-

preted to mean that coastal states may exploi.t the ocean to
any depth which is technologically possible.

Of course, 1.n

exploring thi.s possibility a little further, it is not hard
to see that as science develops, this could give a few

\',

'\

\

technologically advanced nations.virtually unlimited access
to the ocean bottom.
2

u.N.

Coastal states could. simply extend

Document.A/Conf. l3/L.55 (1958), P•

1.

I

- -

~-~

10

'their sovereign jurisdiction out as far as the technology
permitted.

Advanced states could unilaterally claim huge

portions of the sea-bed and this development could set off a
major rush to claim the existing ocean bottom.

This rush

\----'------------

h--------- --f_~

would encompass all-the major powers and could quite possibly
produce conflicts leading to a.world waro · This eventuality
arises out of a possibility that states r1ould begin to claim
sovereignty over the sea or the air

abov~

the shelf and

impose restrictions -upon navigational freedom.
Article 2, paragraph

4,

relates to the addition of

k.
u - - --

materials which includes- "living-organisms belonging to
sedentary species .. '~

-~1 hls.

and cra.bs ·"but no shrimp."

is interpreted to include oysters
Further, analysis reveals that· in

the case-·of. the boundary disputes between states on coasts
facing each other, the issue was to be settled by agreement
or, in the absence of agreement, the- principle of equidistance
from the coa.st-l.ine/bay-llnes was to be applied.

(Further

discussion in this area, i.e., historic bays and straits, was
disseminated by the International Law Commlssion, and \'rill be
discussed later).
The conventions on Fishing and Conservation, and the
High Seas have proven to be less controversial.

This is
-------

primarily true because these were attempts to codify international customs of long standing.

While the first Conference

could be called a success because it dealt positively with
many issues, it neglected to deal with two controversial
issues which were the.major reasons for convening the 1960
conference.

;;;;::::----_

11

Because of the admitted short comings of the first
Geneva Conference a second conference was called by the
General Assembly on December 10, 19;)8.

The Conference was

convened at Geneva between March 16 and

J~pril

..-.

---------

f'

27, 1960.

Eighty-two nations attended the Conference, but the delegates
•

I

returned home 1-1i thout signing a single doctunent of importance.
The Conference failed to solve the problems around which it
was called; namely, the breadth of the territorial sea bordering each coastal state and the establishment of fishing
zones by coastal states in the high seas.contiguous to, but
beyond, the outer limit of the territorial seas of coastal
states.
The factors which contributed tothe controversy ln

this convention were mainly regi.onal; although there was
even some split among the regional blocs.

Fox• instance, the

NATO countries, as. a whole, supported a narrow territorial
sea.

Japan supported this because it wanted to be able to

fish everywhere.

Iceland- did not support this because it

. wanted sole ju.risdiction over its· broad continental shelf in
order to protect its fishing industry.

The Communist Bloc

supported a broad limit for the territorial sea.3

The Arab

countries were united on a 12-mile territorial sea, because
~----------=--

they felt this would aid them in their attempts to block
Israel from the Gulf of Aqaba.
3

Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Costa

Patrick A. Hulloy, "Political Storm Signals Over the
Sea,tt li§.tux•al"HJ.story, LXXXII (December•, 1973), P• 87.

12

Ric-a, the Philippines, and Indonesia supported a 200 mile
l.imi t of the ter:t•i toria.l sea for fishing purposes.

The land-

locked countries of Afganista.n and Bolivia, in particular,

4 The significance of
supported freedom of access to the sea •..

~--

~--c___, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

eo--~

this

11

do nothing" confe1•ence is that it served to keep the

------------

G
...._. _____ _

problem of the sea regime before an international forum.
United

Nat~~-lnvol~~ment

Since 1960

In August 1967, Ambassador Arvid Pardo from Malta
proposed the-following item. for inclusion on the agenda of
the General Assembly of the United Nat ions:
Decl£ration and treaty concerning the reservation
exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and
of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the
limits of pl'esent national jurisdiction, and th~ use
of their pesources in the interests of mankinq.
·
-

'

Mr. Pardo also introduced a draft resolution which called for
the exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean flooi• '1beyond the
limits of present national.jurisdiction 11 from national
appropriation, and the establishment of an international
agency to regulate, supervise, and control all ocean bed
activitieD beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

This

· agenda :1. tem was referred to the General Assembly's First
Committee for further consideration.
The developing states, with few citizens having technical training, were reluctant to take part in the debate,

4Lewis

~llndaries

M. Alexander, (ed.), Law of the Sea Offshore
and Zones (Ohio: Ohio University Press, -i967), p. 28.

5Norrna.n

.

Padelford, ( ed.), fu~.Po~~P:t fQ~
Seas (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute oi' 'fechnolagy Press,
19''tf), P• 23.
"T.

-

~---
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while the great powers were unprepared to consider this agenda
item at this time.

In debating the Maltese proposal in the

First Committee, the
gr~at

SQY.i_~'!;

representative pointed out that a

deaL_Qf preparatory work was needed to. identify and thel').

to agree ui>':m the most appropriate
The representative from the

w~a.Y.f3

of studying the

U~J:t!.t:l.c! ~~.l:l~es

- - - -

matte~~---··

stated that a

11

h_~-~tY

apppoach would inc;l,eed be impr11dent, when all deliberate speed,
6
not .-·········.
indefinite
delay
is call~4
for."
........
-· --·
....
·-

"•"

.. --·

Primarily due to Mra Pardo's instigation, the Genex'al
Assembly approved Resolution 2340 (XXII) on December 18, 1967.

f-'

t·
rd

----

The resolution stressed the importance of preserving the seabed and ocean,floor, and the subsoil thereof, from action and
uses.l-lhich might be detrimental to the common interest of.mankind.

The resolution a1so stated the.t the explora.tlon and use

of thls

al~ea

should be conducted in accordance

\~ith

the

purposes and principles-of the Charter in the interest of
maintaining international peace and ~ecurity and for the
benefit of all mankind. 7 Of even greater importance was the
provision setti.ng up the !_d H'-!<? Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction.

The purpose of the committee was to study the

scope w1d various aspects of the Maltese declaration and
report to the General Assembly during the 23rd Session in 1968.
;;;;------=-==------=---

t

6

"Draft U.N. Convention on the International Sea-Bed
Working Paper Submitted to U.N. Sea-Bed Committee,"
Th~-~:g_a_rtment of State2!±_1leti!!, LXT.II (August 24, 1970),
p. 209.
1Padelford, p. 290.

Area:

u.s.

14
At the 23rd Session, the General Assembly adopted two
resolutions.

The first, Resolution 2467A (XXIII), created a

permanent 42 member Committee for the Peaceful Uses of the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the limits of National
Jurisdiction.

This committee was to consider the various

aspects of the problem centered around two main subjects:
_Legal principles 'governing the use of the international seaa
bed area which are to form the basis of an international
regime; and future machinery to regulate the exploitation of
sea-bed-resources.

The second, Resolution 24670, (XXIII),

requested the Secretary-General to study the establishment of
international machinery to exploit -the resources of the area.
The fii•st resolution passed \vith. a vote of 112 in
favor, none agalnst, and seven abstentionso-· Those abstaining
were

Belol~ussian

SSR, Cambodia, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea,

Hungary, Ukl.. anian SSR, and- the USSR.

They abstained on the

grounds that the permanent committee did not contain an
adequate representation of the Socialist countries, and that
the dl. . aft should have included the continental shelf' within
the limits of the area to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes.

The representative from the USSR stated tha.t this

should have been included to prevent the military use of the
sea-bed and the ocean floor.

8

The second resolution concerning the study of international machinery passed with a vote of
against, and

8

~.N.

25

85

in favor, nine

abstentionso . The vote clearly defined the

Monthly ,Chronicle, VII (January, 1970), P• 73.

-~ .;

B- -

split between the developing states and the developed states.
Th~ ~_E)'\T~_~oping

states V()ted in favor, Hhile the developed

states voted against, or abstained.

The Socialist countries

~--

L_. ________ _

voted against this resolution because they feared that the

i='---

,.

__

creation of such international machinery would only serve the

•·

interests of "capitalist, impel"'ialist monopolies."

The

I

Western bloc f'elt that it was too eaply to be considering such
'

'

a creation, so they abstained.

9

The permanent Sea-Bed Committee reported on its work
··during the 2J-tth Session of the General Assembly. · Resolution

2574A

(XXIV) stated the common belief that there exists an

area of the sea-bed and ocean-floor which lies beyond the
limits -of national jurisdi.ction (recognition of which is
imperative if

th,~re

is to be an international regime); that

this area should be used solely for peaceful purposes and its
resources utllized for the benefit of all mankind;
importantly, that the area
pr~ated

by any nation..

i~1

fu~d

most

question could not be appro ...

The resolution also called on the

Secretary-General to collect the opinions of members on theestablishment of an international regime and what shape it
should take.

The resolution passed with 100 votes in favor,

none against, and 11 abstentions.

Within one year the Soviet
------

Bloc had become convinced of the importance of this work.
Perhaps of even more importance, though, was

25740.

This 1•esolution:
Declares that, pending the establishment of the
aforementioned regllne:

9-

U.No Monthly

Ch~ggicle,

P•

73.

-------
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16
a. States and persons, physical or juridicial,
are bound to refrain from all acti vi. ties of exploi tat ion of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the sttbsoil thereof, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction;
b. No clain1 to any part olO that area or its
resources shall be recognized.
·
This Horatorium Resolution, as might be expected, had
considerable opposition.

It passed by a vote of 62 in favor,

28 against, and 28 abstentions.

The important factor here is

that of the twenty-eight negative votes eight were from the ·
Communist Bloc, sixteenwere from coW1tries located in Western
Europe or the Commonwealth, and the last four were by the
United States, Japan, Sot.lth Africa, and China.
li_zeq

9.9ll~~:t:r>Y 'YJ~s

fav?~ ~~.. ~~~e

in

J,'>6S()l:ution.-

No J.. p,Q.u.s_triaThe U.S. and

the USSR vot•;,d 8.gainst this resolutton on the grounds that it
would 1.n.."11 bit. technological advancement, and that the ob jec~
tives of the Committee should not be to issue prohibitions,
but to insure that technological development and exploitation
wot1ld not pre judice or make more difficult the solution of' the
11

r:

issues current.ly under exruuinatlon. ""1 ,The representatives
f1•om the developing nations felt that if the area was to be
reserved for the benefit of mankind, it was obvious that such
acti vi t:i.es should be withheld until the es ta.blishment of an
..,

international regime~;'
/

At the recommendation of the Sea-Bed Committee the
General Assembly·passed its most meaningful resolution during
the 25th Session.
10

u.N.

l~ •.N.

G.A. Reso1ution 2749 (XXV}, entitled

Document A/7630 {1970).
_l:!OE:ihly

.<~hrorB...£1!,

P • 7.3 •

f----0----

-----_
__
-
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"Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof·, beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction," was adopted by a vote of 108 in favor,
none against, and

14

,__

'----'--------~-

abstentions..

Of major importance here

--

--------

is the fact that no major industrialized country voted against
the pri.nciples as stated in the declaration.

Even though

th~:~

Soviet Bloc abstained in the voting, there appeared to be a
general consensus. on the topic as a whole.
Several ·Of the more important principles of the
declaratlon stated that the area and the resources of the
area are the

~common

heritage of all mankind; the area is not

subject to appropriation by any state or person por are the
rights to the resources .able t.o be appropriated; the exploration of the area shall be carried out for the bene.fit of all
mankind, and taking into particular consideration·the interests
and needs of the developing nations; the area shall be
reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; and parties to any
dispute relating to acti.vities in the area shall resolve these
disputes only using peaceful means as set down in the Charter.
The I"e.soluti.on also called for the establishment of an
int~rnat.ional

regime l-Jhich would " ••• provide for the orderly

and safe development of rational management of the area and
its resources •••• "
ln another resolution, 2750C {XXV), adopted by a vote
of 108 in favor, and s.even against (Soviet Bloc) 1 the General
Assembly decided to convene an international conference in

1973 which would establish an "equitable international regime
including an international machinery -- for the area and

E---

18
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction."

The conference was also to deal with

"a broad range of related issues on the laws of the seas."

pL

In order to prepare for the- conference the Sea- Bed
Committee reorganized itself into three sub-committees.

i-----0-

------

~-

==

Sub-

Conli'llittee I was to prepare draft treaty articles embodying the
I

international regime for the sea-bed area and its resources.
Sub-Committee II was to prepare a comprehensive list of
subjects and. is·sues relating to the law of the sea.

Sub··

Committee III was to deal with ·the preservation of the marine
. i ronment an d sc i ent
·' i fi c reseru:•ch. 12
env

During the 26th Session the General Assembly's
actions consisted mostly of recognition of.the work of the
Sea-Bed Committee and the Assembly expressed its desire that
the wor•k toward the convening of an international conference
in 1973 should continue.

In the resolution (2881 (XXVI)), the

committee was expanded to ninety-one members and the People's
Republic_of-China was named as

on~

of the new members.

This brings us up to the most recent actions of the
United Nations in area of the establishment of a sea regime.
During the 27th Session, G.A. Resolution 3029A (XXVII) was
adopted Wlanimously on December 18, 1972.

The resolution

called for the Sea-Bed Committee to continue its work
preparing for the world conference.

The resolution also:

<;;;:-------::::-:=--.

the Secretary-General to convene the first
session of the ~hird United Nations Conference on

Reqll~~

o==~-----

"

12 Pe.tricia s. Rambach, ( ed.), Issues Before the· 26th
General As~~~.f!!l::l.Y (New .York: Carnegie Endm1ment for Inter:--national Peace, 1971), p. 81.
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the f.Jaw of the Sea at New York for a period of
approximately two weeks in November/D9cember 1973,
for the pur•pose of dealing l>lith or'gan-J.zatioxial
matters, including the election of officers, the
adop~lon of the agenda and the rules of procedure
of the Confer·-ence l' the es tablishm.ent of subsidiary
organs and the allocation of work to these subsidiai'Y organs;

L.: _ __
- ----=--___
-----_

Decides to convene the second session of the
for the purpose of dealing with
substantive work, at Santiago, Chile, in April/Hay
1974,. for a period of eight weeks, and such subsequent sessions, if necessary, as may be decided by
the Conference and approved by the General Assembly,
bearing in mind that the Government of Austria has
offered.Vienna ai a site for the Conference for the
succeedmg year; 3

~nee,

- - -

Conclusion
The stage is set for the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law. of the Sea.

The success of the con-

ference depends entirely on the attitudes of the states that
attend.

Concrete definitions of the "continental shelf" and

"territorial sea" should be establishede

The problem of

fishing rights, which is of great importance to many states,
should also receive the attention of the delegates.

However,

what most states will be looking for is the creation of an
international regime which will supei•vise the future
exploitation of the seas.

The exact powers and functions of

the regime will undoubtedly dom.inate much of the debate at
the conference.

It seems likely at this time that if the

conference, one, uses the "Declaration of Principles Governing
the Sea .. Bed and Ocean Floor, and the Sub-soil 'I' hereof, beyond
the Limi·ts of National Jurisdictlon" as a. starting place; and

13u .N. Docwnent A/RES/3029 ( 1972).

(See Infra, P• 94).
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two, a workable compromise can be reached on the structure of
the regime as outlined in the draft proposals of the various
states (especially the United States, Malta, and the Soviet
Union) then there is a possibility that the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will be able to
accomplish some of its objectives.

'------------

t1 --- --- ....... ~---

CHAPTER III

~-----------

'-'

bt-=--=---------'~-=---OCEAN RESOURCES

A knowledge of the present status and availability of
ocean resources is vital to the understanding of the proposal
to establish an ocean regime. , Indeed, it is due to increased
exploitation of these resources that has called for a sea
regime.

It is hoped that the regime will judiciously allocate

----

---

~

resources consistent \-Jl th both political and humanitarian
factors.
The proposal is unique to international law and
oz•gan:J.zations s

It is questionable whether or not tra.di tional

forms of international ag1•eement are applicable to esta.blish;l.ng an." ocean regime.

Finding a. meaningful form of

reciprocity and mutual benefit- in allocating resources is a
far more delicate procedure than recognizing the symbiotic
nature of an "innocen·t passage" rule.

Furthermore, even

assuming that a satisfactory multilateral method of allocation
were established initially, how stable would it be in the wake
of rapi.d technological change that m:l.ght dis1•upt the fairness
of its distribution?

These perplexing questions are not,

however, the thrust of the current chapter.

The purpose here

is to examine the different cat.egories of ocean resources and
their effect on the proposed ocean regime.
Basically, there are three significant types of oce.an
resources:

living resources (mostly fish), offshore petrolewn

21
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reserves, and hard mineral deposits -- primarily in the form
of manganese nodules. ., All of these resources will have some
affect on the regime.

'fhe potential impact of the manganese

nodules, however. seems to be the most ominous.

This chapter

<=--'---

R-

will discuss all :three categories, the first tHo briefly and
the final one at some length.
·Today's supply of petroleum has reached the point
where its eventual depletion is.forseeable (See Appendix A).
'!'he energy crisis is of particular concex•n to developed

I

states, and especially the United Sta..tes..

The reason for the

concern on the part of. the United States is its vast yearly
con~mmption

of petroleum and natural gas.

Oil and gas supply approximately three-fourths
of this Nation's total energy. vJith only 6 pex•cent
of the world's population, the United States consumes
32 percent of the v.1£rld 's petr•oleum and .')0 percent
of its natural gas.
.
United ·States oil reserves have been declining for
the past decade.

2

As a result the U., S. has been incN1asingly

concerned l-Ji th finding additional sources of oil.

The desire

for expanded oil sources is continually affecting American
policy ln the Middle East.

The reason fo1• this being that

the Middle East countries contain (exclusive of offshore
oil)

11

•••

over 60 percent of the total proven crude

1

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. !!.£P.ort_~~e....§E_eci~u..l?..=££.~..2!!
Outer Continental Shelf, 9lst Congress, 2nd Sess., 1970
\WasflfngtO.n:-Goverrurient Printi.ng Office, 1970), P• 1.
2

u.s.

Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign

Relations, T.Q_)fxQress the Sens!J_~e~a~J.!at .!!~
PreJ>i9ent Should •••• ,_ Hearings, 9lst 'C'ongx'ess, 1st Sess .. ,
l9b9 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 190.
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reserves."

3

Some writers in this field maintain that the

additional reserves of offshore oil have significantly

va~t

lowered the importance of assuring a share of oil from the

[~

>·

~---

Middle East. Such an assumption may be rather hasty.

There

----- --

~---=---------

is no argument on the extent of offshore oil reserves; they
are plentiful.
In the area o.f the

u.s.

continental margin between

200 meters and the seaward edge of the continental

rise alone·, there is contained an estimated 867
billion barrels of oil; 68 billion barrels of natural l~
gas liquids; 2,045 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. ·
The point is, rather, that Middle East

land~based

oil

is more ma..rketable because it is less expensive to exploit
-than the vast reserves of. the continental.margin.
is purely economic.

Much. of the

oc~an

The reason

oil sources lie under

deep water at the.end of the contlnental
shelf
or ..........
beyond.
..........._____
-.
~

'

..

-~

.,.._~---·,---·----..

·--~-~--···

-··

,.···-~--

Even the technological ability.to exploit offshore oil does

not render it economically feasible..

Elaine Burnell explains

why:
Yet, rising teclmological capability does not
necessarily mean lower costs. In fact, the costs of.
petrol.EH:tm per barrel rise exponentially with water
depth. Deep-water oil must compete with shallow-water
oil and with oil produced on the land, as well as with
vast amounts of oil potentially available at some\-Jhat
higher costs from oil shales, tar sands, and the hydrogenatlon of coal •. ,(One must conclude with T. F. Gaskell
that it is unrealistic to expect that an ocean regime will
become rich b~ controlling oil and gas beyond the continental shelf.!?
'

Ocean,"

'/

3J8.Illes W. Oswald, "Toward a Political Theory of the

~.!.PJoi_!;_!ng

the Ocean_!, II (June, 1966), p. 370.

4r}.QJ?~:£..~ b~ .1!.!.~-~S,.eecial Sub-ccmmitte~_.on

1
~ntal; . .§.J~JIJ

p.

~

Outer

Q_o,nt~

5F~laine H. Burnell and Piers von Simson, (eds.), f.?cem
in Marlbus (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, Inc., 197"75);

P• 3.
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As the above quotation indicates the significance of an
ocean regime controlling oil reserves beyond the continental

o::=~

shelf would hardly justify its existence.

~--

The second topic of discussion in this chapter .
concerns the food resources of the oceans.

-------------

- - ----

r---'0-~--------

Traditionally,

the freedom to fish in the high seas went band in hand with
the freedom of the sea-.

Both of these internati.onal

"freedoms" are basedon the copcept of inexhaustibility.

v~I

The a.rgument is that since the supply (of fish or water) is
"""---------

W1limited, Ltse by one person cannot harm another.
De

Emerich

Vattel in 1883 put forth this principle in his book, lli

~~i-Q. f. .!'!..~li9!l§..

It is manifest that the use of the open sea, \~hich
consists :i.n navlgation and fishing, is innocent and
!!!BX~~1!i~1~; that is to say -u· hl3 lcJho navigates
or• fishes in the open sea does no injury to anyone,
and the sea, in these t\oJO respects, is sufficient for
a.ll rnankinq. 6
The concept of an inexhaustible supply of fish may
have been valid in 1883, but it is not true in modern times.
The myth of abundance is no longer credible. From
the Second \<Jorld War until 1968, the world catch of fi.sh
increased at about the rate of 6~7% per year. The catch
in 1969 was less than tl::tat of the pi•evious year. While
the 1970 catch is likely to be larger, the past rate of
inc1.. ease cannot be ma.i.nta.ined into the future. Recently
made px•o jections indicate that the rate of. increase -_
will only be about 2-lt-% per year until 1985, and may
even level off after that. But even though the supply
of fish is liroi ted, the demand will continue to grorJ
and the consequences will become increasingly severe. 7

6
-phia~ T.

Emerich De Vattel. 'fhe Law of Nations ( Philadelw. Johnson & Con~any;-ld8jf~25.

& J.

7

.

Fr•a.ncis 11'. Christy, Jr..

"Fishery Problems and the

U.s. Draft Art:l.cle, •• -(paper z•ead at the 4th Sea Grant Conference, October 13, 1971, Madison, Wisconsin),p. 5.
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Pnst assumptions of unlimited supplies of natural
re~ources

have continually proven incorrect.

Francis Christy

relates the supply of fish to past beliefs about the supply
r - : - - - - - - - - - - --

of American range.

-----

i- ~
~

The case of the western range lands is instructiveo
·In 1870, it reported that 'all the flocks and herds in
the 't'Jorld could find ample pasturage on these unoccupied
plains and the mountain-slopes beyond; and the time is
not far distant when the la.rgest flocks and herds in
the world wlll be found here, t-Jhere the grass grm·Js
and ripens untouched from year to year.' Such remarks
about inexaustibility are not dissimilar to past
a.ssertions 8about the inexhaustibility of the sea's
fisheries.

-·

·------ --

~------

In modern times regional shortages of certain species
of fish are not uncommon.

P-

-~------~---

[-=!----

9

Despite the growing need for a system of allocating
the living resources of the sea, it remains unlikely that
the proposed sea regime could function in this capacity.

,fj

~r-:

National patterns of fishing are firmly set in traditional
ways.

In addition, and as discussed in Chapter V, the

.fishing controversy is closely related to the dispute ove1•
national jurisdiction.

It seems that whatever limit prevails

for national economic zones will also 'serve to create
enforceable £trea.s of national fishing rights.
The third category of ocean wealth is hard minerals,

primarily in the form of maneanese nodules. ·Of all the
resources discussed ocean reserves of valuable metals seem
the most inaccessible.

However, it appears that the necessary

technology to economically exploit ocean nodules is already
e---

8
9

Chrlsty, p. 2.
Christy, P• I+•
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being develqped.

The potential production

o1.~

minerals from

manganese nodules bear.s the highest significance for an
ocean regime.

It is with respect to the minjLng of nodules
1·,

-------

that an international regime ls most critical.J:y needed to
perform two vital tasks.

-----

"'----'---------

One iS to prevent a "gold rush"

type of confrontation .among the developed na:tlons wishing to
collect the nodules. · The· second is to protec·t the economies
of those developing countries whose.GNP depends largely on
their land-based mining of minerals which the manganese nodule
may make plentiful (See Appendix B).

The dis:cussion that

follo-ws will present .,information on the extent, value and
increasing accessibility of manganese rese:t•ve.s e

It also

examines the possible economic impa.ct that la.rge-scale
production of nodules
~

resource

n~ay

have around the w:.:> rld.

The sea today is destined to become the greatest
1.. eserve

available to mankind.

and on the ocean floor are in abundance.

Minerals in the water
The race for

development and exploitation of these resources will
inevitably bring about conflict, and inequities will arise
if exploitation activities are not adequately controlled.
Ocean resources will affect (in ter•ms of economic
feasibility, individual national interests, and geographical
- - -

locations) the function and structure of a sea regime.

Prior

to 1970, the impact of the actual importance of sea-bed
development had not struck its target insofar as national
interests were·concerned.

The need for technological

development and future prospects toward the oceans was
deemed inevitable and necessary in order to sustain future

-"'-"------

n
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generations' demands for materials contained on the ocean
floor.
Today, technological advancements have permitted us
~-

to explore the sea-beds.

The resources have been found to be

----

---

~---------

abundant, and the economic influences have directed the
attention of many developed nations toward the explo:J.tation
of these resources •. The sea resources referred to are b1own
as sea-floor nodules, generally called manganese nodules,
since manganese is the dominant mineral in these nodules.
The other major. contents-in these. nodules include nickel,
coba.l t, copper, zinc,. molybdenum, zirconium, cerium, lead,
titaniwu, iron, vanadium and several rare earth elements.
'I'hese nodules are abundant, and uncontrolled exploitation· of'
tlwse nodules could cause,market "flooding" (See Appendix C).
According to John 1,. Mero, of the aforementioned metals only
manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, and

zirconi~l

would be produced in quantities which could upset present
10
world sources of these metals.
The next step in the investigative process is
·ascertaining how much of a nodule reserve is contained on
the ocean floor, and the estimated worth of such resourceso
According to A. M. Auburn:
One square-mile of the sea-bed floor may be covered
with 70,000 tons of' nodules, containing 30,000 tons of
manga.r1ese, 3,600 tons of aluminum, 2,300 tons of cadmium,
17,000 tons of iron, 400 tons of cobalt, 1,200 tons of
nickel, and 650 tons of copper. The value of the

------------------10

John L. Mero, "A

Lega~

Regime for Deep Sea Mining,"

§.!r.l.Qt<2.S2..l!~~~ VII (July, 1970), P• 496.
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mangattlse alone can be ashigh as ~9,520~000 per square
mile.
According to John L. Mero, there would appear to be
"about 1.5 trillion tons of nodules now exposed to the surface

[

________ _
________ _

i----0---

;._.::.

of the sediments of the Pacific Ocean."

He goes on to sayf

~---------

that if only ten percent of the deposits prove economical to exploit, such as manganese, nickel, cobalt, and
copper, using average percentage of these metals, it can
only be calculated that the reserves of these metals in
the nodules are measured in terms of thousands ~f years
on the basis of present-day world consumption. 1
In effect, the nodule reserves could be considered to be

I!

unlimited.

Another argument supporting this would be the
L_;

=- ---------

point brought up by Fatrick.Childs.

--~---

"There is some evidence

to support the contention that these nodules are being manu-

·.

factured on the. ocean floor at a faster r•ate than we aJ:•e using
'

.

the materials on a yearly basis."

13

·

The abundance of sea-bed resources has drawn the
..

attention of

d~veloped

nations all. over the t>Jorld.

This has

encouraged competition in the development of machinery and
~--

techniques for exploitation of these resources ata rapid
rate and has precipitated a race that almost every developed
nation is participating in.
In 1961, the bathyscaphe Trieste I reached the
deepest sea-bed within the framework of the U.SoNavy
programme. In 1966, the Trieste II found the main .
- - -

11

F. M. Auburn, "The International Sea-Bed Area,"
International and Com arative Law
, XX (April,
1971 ' p. 17 •
12
Auburn, p. 176.
l3Patrick Childs, "The Interests of Land-Locked
States In Law of the Sea," San Diegq Law Revt_~, IX (May,
1972), P• 499.
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portion of the hull of the sunken nuclear submarine
Thresher at a 4epth of 8,400 feet. In 1966, the
submersibles Alvin and Aluminaut aided in the location
of a lost U. S. hydrogen bomb in deep waters off
Palomares 3 Spain. Since 1966, the Navy has possessed
the capability of enabling divers, by a minor surgical
operation, to descend to 12,000 feet, although this
has not been tested in the actual environment. In
1968 1 the U.S. Navy commissioned two deep toJater submersibles, Sea Cliff and Turtle, three man crerJ
vehicles, capable of operating at depth~ of several .
thousand feet. In 1968,. the deep drilling ship Glomar
Challenger found oil formations in tl1e Sigsbee Knolls
region in the Gulf of Mexico, at a depth of nearly
12,000 feet. In 1969, the vehicle Alvin was recovered
from a depth of over ,5,000 feet :i.n the North Atlantic.
By 1974, it is expected that the petr•oleum industry
will have the capability to drill and produce at
depths of up to 1,,500 feet, and by 19Bo the industry
expects to be able to reach 6,000 feet. 11I
.

•=
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The Scripps

Institution o.f Oceanography is nm.J operating a tank-like
remote underwater manipule.tor, (RUM), capable of worki.ng i.n
depths up to 6JOOO feet of water, lifting loads up to 1,000
It surveys the ocean floor by 'television and performs

.

. 15

such tasks as planting instruments on the ocee.n floor.

In

1972, the Hu§:les 'rool Company announced that const1•uction was
under 'Way on- a three hundred and twer1ty-four foot barge and
a five hundred and sixty-five foot mining vessel for the
mining of manganese nodules.

'l'he vessels are designed to be

operational at depths from 12,000 feet to 18,000 feet.
These technological advances are due to the econo.:nic

-------···----------14

Auburn, P• 174.

15

.

Auburn, p. 17.5.
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prototypes of sea-bed exploitation is the industrial develop-

lbs.

----

L_ _ _ _

More important than these steps leading to the actual

ment of sea-bed exploitation machinery itself.

--- - - - - -
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feasibility of the estimated receipts from resource
exploitation.

Although dependence on the sea-bed for

r~sources

is technically in the experimental and plann+ng stage, it

..
~

~------

----
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should be hereby noted that approximately twenty percent of
the world supply of oil comes from under the sea.

The current

annual market value of this offshore oil is eight billion
dollars.

16
Deep-Sea Ventures, a subsidiary of 'l'ennace, together

with a subsidiary of a. large German minlng firm, Metallgesellschaft, of Frankfurt, is spending between $5 1 000,000
and $10,000,000 on developing the recovery technology conearning resources.

This will be sold to a consortium worth

a capital of between $1,000,000,000 and

~
17
~2,000,000,000.

The product value of one of these operations would be about

$1.8 billion if all products \<Jer•e sold at today' s market
price.

The capital investment to build the facilities to

mine and handle SO,OOO tons of the nodules per day can be
ex~pected

to be $200 million. The net profit would probably
/
J8
be about $800 million after u.s. taxes.·
A major concern in the area of economics is the

distribution of the sea-bed nodules themselves.

According to

John L. Mero, one of the characteristics of the nodules is
the marked change in the composition over large lateral
distances in the Pacific Ocean.

16

.Auburn, p. 115.

17Auburn,
18

p.

176.

Mero, p. 497 •
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Along the continents, they are rich in iron, while
in the central.part of the ocean and on certain
topographical highs, the nodules tend to be enriched
in cobalt. In several areas of the Pacific, the
nodules are almost pure manganese dioxide. In the areas
of the ocean far removed from islands or continents,
the nodules are rich in nickel and copper. As the
equatorial regions are approached, the pe19entage of
copper in the nodules increases markedly •.

[_

It can be assumed that due to rapid technological
developments of deep-sea exploitation machinery and
tremendous economic possibilities concerning sea-bed resources,
conflicts will arise over sea-bed rights, rights to profits,
and benefits of sea resources.

These conflicts will inevi-

tably reflect the interests of nation-states. \Many developing~
nations are seeking to protect their current

land~based

ms.rkets for minerals, while develop·ed states are anxious to
add to their dwindling-sources of mineral and petroleum
reserves.(
What is the probable economic impact of manganese
nodules exploitation?

Before this question can be answered,

one must determine, first of all, the probable mineral yield
from new ocean mining techniques and secondly, the amount of'
time necessary to build up that yield.
Estimates are that within the next ten years 1 the
first operator will be mining and processing the nodules on
ru1 economic, large-scale basis, at a rate of at least

3,000,000 tons per year.

Within

15

years, at least five

operators will be mining and processing about
of the nodules per year.

19

Mere, p. 499o

Within the next 30

50

million tons

ye~rs,

at least
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50

operators will want to produce about 200 million tons of
20
the nodules per year.
If these estimates are correct, the

economic impact of ocean minerals will be significant.

Such

B

h-:_-_ _

a sudden supply will naturally lower the price of those

minerals being sold on the world market.
The most important benefit of the exploitation of
sea-bed resources in the long run is likely to.be the
expansion of the world resource base of several minerals,
· some of v1hich might otherwise be in short supply in a
few decades.
While this development is beneficial .from a global
viewpoint, it has already caused concern in developing
countries that are traditional exporters of some of
these minerals. These countries fear that exploitation
of minerals and metals from sea-bed resources, such as
manganese nodules, might cut into the demand for their
exports ~nd result in a lower price-level of their
exports. l
·
Acco1•ding to a study by the U. N. Secretariat, a

lower market value will benefit the users of hard minerals
who are primar1ly developed states.

.e.

·It follows from the foregoing [f.
sea-bed resources
will depress pricey that the greater availabilities
and presum.ed lo\-H3r marginal costs associated with the
producti.on of minerals from the sea-bed would bring
direct benefits to the consumers of the minerals
concerned, l:Jho are, by and large, ~2e mineral-using
industries in developed countries. -

At the same time many developing nations who rely on landbased mineral production for a significant portion of their

GNP would be seriously hurt by a sudden drop in the price of
minerals.
20

Wolfgang Friedman notes.this situation when he

1'-'lero, p. 499.
21
Rambach, p. 84.
22u .. N. Document A/AC.l38/73 (1972), p. 28.
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comments::
The economic consequences of exploiting such mineral~,
as copper or nickel in marketable quantities from nodule --)
concentratlons is potentially formidable. By making
certain relatively scarce materials abundant, it could c
completely upset the international cormnodities markete
This in turn could deeply affect the attitude of certain
major producers, like Chile, and to a lesser extent Peru,
which would have an economic interest in pre2~nting
exploitation of copper from the ocean floor.

..--:;
r-~

--

------------~--~--------
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There is little doubt that uncontrolled market
flo6ding of certain minerals would cause economic chaos in
several developing states.

The problem is that if ocean

resources· ar•e developed and mined at present levels of con ...
sumption and with the full utilization of present technology
(and developing technology), it has been calculated that on
the world market, some minerals would drop as much as fifty
percent in price (See Appendix D} • 2 4 This would be dev as ta.-.
ting to developing nations relying on the exportation of
these minerals.
An example of market impact is the possible effects
of sea mining. on the world market for cobalt.
The impact of sea~bed supply on the cobalt market
could be quite dra~atic, if the high Co content nodules
of the mid-Pacific rise were mined. - In this area, west
of Hawaii, a single mining operation dredging 1 million
tons of nodules per year with 2 percent Co content would
be able to supply about 19,200 tons of cobalt. This is
equivalent to almost the total output from land in 1969,
and would ~punt to half of the possible 1980 world demand
.for cobalt • .?
The need for an international regime to soften the

2 3wolfgang Friedman, The Future of the Oce~ (New
York: George Braziller, Inc.,. 1971), p. 22.
24
.
Childs, p. 410.
2 5u.N. Document A/AC.138/73, P• 11.

~ _;
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impact of ocean mineral production is clear.

Indeed, there

seems to be no alternative to an ocean regime if the effect
of ocean mining is to be mitigated.

This is the conclusion

c

~-------- - - - -

of the United Nations' study on the economic impacts of
ocean mineral production.
Mineral sea-bed production could not be assumed to
have such a moderate impact-on world mineral markets
uriless the.rates at whi~h new supplies were marketed
were st;rictly controlled by the internationa~ authority
which it is envisaged should be established. 6

26

U.N. Document

A/AC.l38/73, p. 30.
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A POLITICAL THEORY FOR THE OCEANS
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The purpose of the current chapter is to analyze some
varying general and philosophical approaches to the sea-bed
issue.

'l1his chapter, therefore, serves as an introduction

to the one that follows which deals with specific political
conflicts related to the sea regime.

The point is not to
~ --~-=-

-- -~--

present or even to support a particular philosophical bent,
but rather, to identify and evaluate several different
approaches.

This thesis attempts to present the political

context and issues involved ln a sea regime in an objective
and realistic manner

Q

Therefore, this chapter strives to

strike a distinction between a philosophical and ideological
approach versus a realistic and pragmatic one •
. At the outset it may be prudent to explicate the
inherent poll tical nature of the sea-bed issue_.
are both national and international in character.
intermin~led

The politics
Inevitably

in the political milieu is the escalating

scientific knowledge and tecnnological developments related
to the oceans and sea-beds.

Scientists are unable to free

themselves from the political context around the sea-bed
issue.

Robert L. Friedheim has noted this phenomenon.

Ocean science is inextricably caught up in the
politics surrounding the uses and expected uses of
the sea. We can offer no panacea for those ocean
scientists who would like to assur-e themselves of

36
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stable working conditions with the stroke of a pen.

1

Cop.versely, international political forums, policies, and
circumstances can be drastically altered by changes in
scientific knowledge and technological progress.

r~

Richard

L_ __ -

-- --

F--

~--==------------====

Symonds in discussing international functional agencies has

~------------

argued that the attempt by these organizations to separate
science from politics is futile.
Yet Science is seldom neutral. The discoveries
which are promoted by and the innovations \vhich are
introduced by international functional agencies
often contain a concea2ed and unappreci.ated element
of political dynamite.
The issue at hand is inescapably political and
international in scope.

A ke¥____~.9l1~~pt in the_

v_i_r.tually---any interna-tional
national_~~~~rests.

cont;poy:~-r-~_y_is

the

flJ~?~Il.S.~:lglJ___ of
rol._~_,..of

It is primarily around this concept

that tho varying philosophical approaches to the sea regime
issue are set.
Some authors have rejected the theory of national
interests and have supplanted alternative rationales.

For

example, Clark M. Eichelberger, writing in the San Diego
~~~ie~,

L~

has argued for replacing national interest with the

concept of common heritage.

He states:

Another argument directed against the immediate
establishment of an international agency to administer
the sea's resources is that successful maritime powers
cannot place their economic interests in the hands of
1
Robert L. Friedheim and Joseph B. Kadane. "Ocean
Science in the UN Political Arena,-" .Journal of Haritime Law
and Comme~, III (April, 1972), p. ~1.
2
Richard Symonds, Internati.onal Administration
. Its. E;_vol.~_!;ion ancL_Conteme.9rary Appllcations (London: Oxford
University Pl~ess, 1971), P• 1i1J.

s-

---------

a parliamentary majority of the General Assembly in
which the underdeveloped States have a majority vote~
It should be remembered that the resources of the sea
and seabed are the common heritage not only of the
maritime powers but of the developing States and the
landlocked States as well. All of them will be a factor
in determining the regime of the future.J

p

L ______ _
;:_:

_ _ __
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Dr. Eichelberger confuses a realistic political
argument l-Jith a philosophical or moral judgment.

That is to

say that even if one grants to Dr. Eichelberger that ocean
resources are the common heritage of all nat ions, more..lly
speaking, that does not affect the unwillingness of the
maritime powers to cooperate in_the regime's "immediate

I
!
'

.

establishment."

Basically, he is asking what should be, to

'="---,.-,--- - - - - - - -

control what is.
A more extensive philosophical framework from which
to approach the sea regime controversy has been suggested
by Elisabeth Borgese.

She develops her argument based on

the presumption that the oceans are free and that this status
, is an old and solid international lawo
-

The·oceans are free. The mere thought that they
could be "appropriated" by any ruler hm·Jever mighty,
by e.ny nation, no matter ho-vJ vast l ts empire, he.s something blasphemous about it. The oce ens, 1.n a way, are
the most sublime expression on earth of what is
·
extra~human, superhuman, indomitable.
That the oQefulS
are free is the oldest of all international laws.~
From the assumption that the oceans are free and land
is not, Dr. Borgese suggests that a dichotomy exists in the

3Clark M. .Eich.e1berger "The United Nations and the
1
Bed of the Sea,"
p~

San Diego

La~·J

Revie1-1,

VI (Ju.ly, 1969),

349.

Regime,''
p. 216.

l~Elisabeth

Borgese, "Tm-Jard an International Oce~m
Texas ..l.!}ternat ional LaH Ii'orum, V (Winter, 1969),

- - - -
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method of ownership for these respective areas.

She holds

that two opposing laws are at work: the law of the sea (a
system of collective O"t-mership and freedom'· of use for all)
t:=

versus the law of the land.(the traditional method of private

~------

---

r---------

,..-'-';

ownership by nation-states).

Dr. Borgese concludes that the

~---

---- ---

conflict between these opposing forms of ownership, rather
than conflictlng national interests or incongruence betv-Jeen
national and international interests, is the real crux of the
sea-bed issue.
Thus,. it is not really any conflict bett'lleen national
law and international law that is in the l.vay of the
international ocean regime. The opposition of what
appears to be national interests against international
interests really comes to an opposition of the law of
the land (whether national or international) against
the law of the sea (whether national or international).
This opposition is as much histbrical as political;
as much economic as historical; as much psychological
as economic; as much ideological as psychological--at
which point we close the circle and re-enter at the5
level of history and politics, in the widest sense.
Clearly then, as Borgese develops it, the nations of
the world have two roads to cho6se from.

One is to extend

the law·or the land across the continental shelf down the
remainder of the continental margin and out over the ocea.n
floor.

The second road is to apply the law of the sea to

submarine areas.

Borgese explains this choice in the

following passage:

Two cou~ses are_ open to-mankind. On~ is· to extend
the law of the land to the submarine, lands. .That is,
as technology.develops, the developed.nat-i.ons would
appropriate ever larger portions of the submarine
lands and subject them to their national juri.sdiction.
The other course is to extend the law of the seas to
the ocean floor, adding a further freedom to those

5Boreese,

p. 22).
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embodied in the Conventions on the High Seas by
declaring that the ocean floor and its resources are
the property of mankind as a \-Jhole, are G(jd' s road,.
and cannot be appropriated by ony Nation.
In the final analysis Dr. Borgese views the choice

p~

c;_--- -

between the two systems described above as a choice between
a peace system and a war system.

She further maintains that

combining the law of the seas for the high sea with a law of
the land for submarlne territory will.fail due to inherent
conflicts in their nature.
Borgese concludes her agreement with the follOi·Jing
statement •
.Thus, the conflict is between the law of the land
and the law of the sea. Considering that ocean space
is an ecological 1-1hole, it seems logical that we cannot
have one kind of regime for the deep seas (the law of
the land, baaed on ownership, territoriality, sovereignty)
and another kind of regime for the high seas or superjacent l~s.ters (the law of the sea, based on common
property, nonterritoriality, and trans-sovereignty)o
If these two systems are conflicting, they e.re bound to
clash and one will prevail. The law-of-the-sea system,
however, is a peace system, a system of mutual cooperation. The lEnJ-of-the-land sy~tem is a war system, a
system of exclusion, competi tton e.nd conflict. Hence,
our option ought to be clear.
The approach expounded by Elisabeth Mann Borgese a.nd
paraphrased above is subject to question.

An examination of

its tenets and conclusions may be instructive.

As with most

systems oftmught, the crucial point is often in the beginning -- the assumptions upon. which later arguments or
conclusions are 'based.

Eorgese begins her statement (as

quoted above) Hi th the sentence, "The oceans

6

Borgese, p. 220.

7

Borgese, p. 226.

a1~e

free, 11 and

-
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two sentences later, "That the oceans are free is the oldest
of all international laws."

8

Dr. Borgese implies that

international law, or the age of this law and not national
interests is what keeps the oceans free.

This is a misunder-

~--~---

;:j -- -------~

standing of. the role of international law.
has been reversed..

The causal link

It is the mutual interests. o-f nat·ions
·--·--"····~·~•··•·••"''''"·" ··•·' • ..,, --•·

·····•• " " " ' " •••• ... •""••''"'•'>•-"'·"·-.n,,••'""·~-~, ·•··••· • ·• •

which .allows···internationaL l.!'l:.!L:t-.9. exist and . UQ~
Myres

s.

.Y~?~ .Y~rsa.

McDougal aptly clarifies the juxtaposition of

international law and national interests.
Thus, when one contraposes international law and
the vital interests of states, one is creating an
opposition that we simply cannot live with. International law is established and maintained only
because·it secures and protects the vital interests
or· states. 9
.
.·
..

p---

One piece of supportive evidence for McDougal's.
thesis is the px•i.nc:i.ple in international law of
~~(while

things thus stand).

r_~s

si_~,

This principle implies

that treaties "cease to be obligatory when the conditions
upon which they were founded have substantially changed."

10

Borgese 1 s implication that age will add credence to
an international law does not stand· true.

A nation whose

vital intex•ests run counter to even, the oldest international
law is not likely to continue its observance.

A clear

example is current claims by some countries of' a 200 mile

8

Borgese, p. 226.
9
.
Alexander, p. 1.
10
Urban G. Whitaker Jr., Politics and Power A Text
in International Law (New York: Harper -&-Row-;-1964), p; 'b54.

territorial zone despite a long-standing limit of three
miles, traditionally observed by virtually all -nations.·
It seems that Dr. Borgese fails to understand why
[_

the oceans are free.

She maintains that it is because of

--

----
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the law of the sea, which is a collective and cooperative
system.

Once again she·assumes law to. be the causal factor
I

rather than politics.

Urban Whitaker has a different view

of the relationship of international law to politics.
Again it seems inappropriate to attach more
relevance to legal than to political considerations
in such a situation. States which have the power
to do so will exercise de facto control over such
maritime waters as they deem necessary to the
security and ~rosperity of their territories and
populations. 1

>•

B---- - ------ -

The freedom of the seas existed historically because
no single nation had the poHer nor the will to control the
seas.

Today much of the freedom· of the.seas rests upon the

advantages of reciprocity for free passage and uninterrupted
trade.
some

The freedom of the .sea, therefore,. does not stem from

my~tical

transformation in human nature as he passes

from land to sea as Dx•. Borgese ·suggests with her opposing
legal systems for earth and water.
In today's world the capability to control more and
more ocean space is rapidly increasing.

This situation

places more reliance upon reciprocity to maintain the freedom
of the seas.

The principle of reciprocity requires countries

to consider more than their immediate gain in protecting
their national interests.

Lewis Alexander provides an
~-----

11
Whitaker, p. 312.
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excellent example of this in the following quotation:
To persona·not acquainted with the national interests
of the United States in the world as a. whole, or not
concerned therewith, the national interest in our coastal
waters is to establish boundaries as far out into the
ocean as we can get away with and establish exclusive
jurisdiction over everything therein to the United States.
The trouble with this parochial view is that whatever the United States can do in this respect it has·to
agree that other countries can do the same thing, The
reaction we got from the blunder of issuing the ·rruma.n
Proclamation on Fisheries in September, 1945, is that
other countries t-Jill claim moz•e than any new claim the
United States makes, deliberately interpret the new
claim the United States makes. in their favor, and use
our new claim,. their new claim, and their misinterpretation of our new claim, as.substant:J:.ation for eny
acti.on .they wish to 1 zake over and above what the United
States wants to do.

[1 __
_ _ _ __
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In the final analysis, then, the problem of
establishing an ocean regime is not. a choice between opposing
systems of international law but rather a complex political
problem.

Arvid Pardo confirms this sentiment:

Thus, the creation of an international regime for the
sea-bed is not merely a legal task, .. but is assent ially a
delicate political task that must balance f~ndrunentally
different, but basic, poll tical ·interests e
. It is the intent of this thesis to analyze the isstles
related to the ocean regime in a pragmatic and realistic
manner rather than viewing them through the lens of a
preconceived philosophy.

There is, of course, danger in

assuming that because one speaks of rational interests and
realism that he- is avoiding philosophical

bias~

Advocates of

12

Alexander, p. 12.5.

l3Arvi.d Pardo, "An International Regime for the Deep
Seabed:: Developing Lat~ or Developing Anarchy?'t Texas
International L~ Forum, V (Winter, 1969), p. 21S.
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"realism" can become a drag on 'possible political solutions
and innovations by too narrowly construing a nation's
interests or the possibllities for compromise and progress.

b

~"

~--

Wolfgang Friedmann in his book, The Future or the o~~an~,

;....:::

_______ _
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speaks to this point:
Even the most short-sighted advocates of "national
i-nterests" Cl:).n hardly welcome a world in lvhich groups
of states will claim vast stretches of the seas around
them as their own, while others extend sea-bed operations
further and further outward, with the inevitable result
of Jg~creasing curtailment of internationa~ fishing end
ni:x~7~!1t'gation, and the threat of confrontation, at the
bottom of the oceans + ~:o_day' s "realismtt becomes the
madness of tomorrow. 11
In this thesis, and particularly in the current
·sect ion, dealing t.zith the. political issues, an attempt is
made to use realismand the analysis. of national interests
as an analytlcal tool rather than a philosophical approach&
The pitfalls that Pr·ofessor Friedmann -\-larns of are realo

The

self-fulfilling prophecy of "realistic pessimism" can hinder
new avenues of international cooperation.

It is also easy

however,· to fall back on an overs:tmplified and optimisti.c
approach as Dr. Borgese has -done.

In conclusion, the pur•

pose here is to avoid these extremes, to use realism in the
analytical sense, to consider the problems and issues as
they are and not to predict or suggest solutions.
1

~riedmann,

p. 81.
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CHAPTER V
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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICTS
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The study of international relations in modern times
has witnessed

t~Jo

dynamic conflicts in the world.

One is·

the struggle between East and West (competition between the
superpowers).

The other is a North-South struggle between

the developed and developing nations.
in his book, The
conflicts.

Migh~__of ~ati~~~,

has centered on these

Stoessinger says of his own

••• the
are the two
struggle of
nationalism

John G. Stoessinger

wo~k;

book is focused upon what the author believes
truly dominant events of' our time: the
East ve.rsus West, aY:d the stl"•uggle of
versus colonialism.

The- sea-bed issue has served to bring the latter
ciash into focus.

It is primarily around the opposition of

the developed and developing countri'es that the .important
issues related to a sea regime are organized.

The

North~

South struggle has become, in this arena at least, the
predominant conflict.

The superpowers find themselves uneasy

partners since many of their national interests coincide -with
regard to a sea regime.

Often when the interests of the

superpowers coincide, agreement and progress are expedited.
In this case, as with others in international affairs,
the serving of superpower interests is a prerequisite
1

John G. Stoessinger·, The t>Iigh~..~~-J::!ations (New York:
Random House, 1969), P• 5•.
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to real progress.

Senator Pell draws this point:

Among these realities, or obstacles in the view·
of some, are the interests of the United States, of
the Soviet Union, and of other maritime powers, and
these interests must be adequately recognize~ and
protected if any regime is to exist in fact.

--------=-=-==-=-=--=
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Due to the interplay of both the North-South and

t;;; ____
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East-West struggles, however, the situation is far more
I

complex than just meeting basic superpower interests.

The

appeasement of developing cotmtries and thei.r suppol"t has
become a goal of superpower competition.
interests of the developing

1

'1 herefol~e,

countr~e_f)_El:re l).()t ).t~E!JY

--

completely ignored by the superpowers.

the
_:to be
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As a result the

proposal to establish an ocean regime faces a dilemma and a
current sta.lemateo

The developed nations, in the meantime,

are pu:r.'suing tll.eir.own economic end,s whichare often
explained in altJ:•u.istic terms ..
••• too often the developed have talked as if the
schemes they propose concerning the law of the sea were
pure altruism, having nothing to do lid th thei.r national
interests, and put forth entirely. to pr•otect the inter ...
ests of the world conununity as a." whole. In some
respects," these assertions are correct. In other
respects they are pnre sham--as the developing claim.
Such cynicism among the developing is 1ustified if
only because it is difficult for even the developed
sponsors to separate the self .. serving from the
altruistic. 3
A rather convincing example of this mixture of selfinterest and altrLlism is the October 30, 1968 statement of'
2

Elisabeth M. Borgese, (ed.), Pacem in
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1.972), p. 2.31.

Maribu~

(New

3Robert L. Friedheim, "A Law of the Sea Conference-·
Who Needs It?" (unpublished paper prepared for the Symposium
on International Relations and the Future of Ocean Space,
April 12, 1972, University of South Carolina), p. 5.
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President Nixon regarding the oceans.

On the one hand, the

United States'. intention to guard national in:terest is
clearly stated:-:
Making full use of the 1966 Act, it will be a first
priority of my Administration to present to the Congress
an integrated and. comprehensive program in oceanography.
The purpose of this program will be to:
••ePromote international cooperation when such
cooperation is in the best interests of the United
States.4
In the same statement improving the economic position of the
United States in the fishing 1.ndustry is rationalized on the
basis of feeding the hungry peoples of the woz•ld.

~-

-------

-----

The United States fishing industry has deteriorated,
and I have spoken before of the failure of our existlng
· Federal programs to encourage the fishing industry to
modernize fast enough to counter foreign competition.
But fleet modernization is only one of the many types
of technologicaL e.dvances that can bring the United
States back to a position of leadership in the fishing
industry-~and enable· us to reap a he.rvest from the sea
that \dll provide an inexpenslve source of r.:Protein
.ror the malnourished peoples of the world._:)
.
Currently, the.world's fish supply of many species
cannot withstand another fully modernized fishing fleet.Wolfgang Friedmann has observed that tra.•Jlers from the Soviet
Union and Japan, which have developed fish processing ships
and mass fishing techniques ha.ve been indiscriminately overfishing.

Some ships actually "herd" entire schools of fish
-----

by sonar.

This type· of unregulated "'fishing" has resulted 1.n

near extlnction of many species of whales and a rapid
decrease in other commpn sea fish such as the California

4Padelford,

e:---------

P• 337•

5Padelford, P• 334·
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sardine, Northwest Pacific salmon, and the Barents Sea codo 6
Despite the dtLnger• of overf:t.ahing, (another example
of the mixture of self-interest and altruism) the USSR
maintains it has, and is, conserving llving ocean resources.

~-- - - -
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Mr .. Khlestov made the follm.Jing statement be.fore the United
Nations Sea-bed

Co~~ittee:

'l'he· question of fishing was. related t.o that of the
territorial sea~ It was a difficult issue, but agreement had already been reached on the principle of
rational exploitation of living resources; all countries
had stated that they were taking steps to ensure the
conservation of those resources. 7
The fishing issue, while not directly germane to the ocean
regime, illustrates the propensity of nations to m.ix self
interest with altruism.

Proposals for an ocean reglme face

this-identical problem.
It is the main purpose of -the present chapter to
examine some of the critical political issues involved in the
sea-bed proposal.

In analyzing each issue particular atten-

tion will be paid to the conflicting interests of the developed and developing nations.
in this chapter are:

The three issues of discussion

one, national jurisdiction; two,

scientific research and the effects of technology; and three,
timing of the regime.
Def';_ning National Jurisdiction
n

In the present examination of the issue of defining
national jurisdictions analysis is made of the conflicting
interests between developed and developing states, as well as

6Friedmann, P• 27.
7u.N .. Document A/AC .. l38/SC. II/SR.l4 (1971), P• 147.
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between coastal and non-coastal nations.

Also included in

this section is a discussion of some of the various proposals
for establishing uniform boundaries ..for coastal states.
The importance of establishing natlonal boundaries on

,.c

~--

- - - - - - -----

~----------

the continental shelf and the territorial sea with regard to
an ocean regime should be self-evident

G

Clearly, the fur•ther

national jurisdictions extend on the continental shelf the
less important a regime will be.

The.value of the resources

or the continental ·shelf are inversely proportional to theil"
distance from the coast-line.

r- -----~~-~~----- -----

Whether a wide-band or a narrow-band concept of
national jurisdiction ultimately prevails will make an
enormous difference in the potential economic value of
ocean resources coming under·· the control of an ocean
regime ••• ~If an ocean regime controlled the disposition
of all resoul'ces beyond the traditional three-mile
limit, it would possess bi~lions of dollars of assets
even u.n.der existing technologies of t'ecovery. If,
on the other hand, its aLtthol"i ty began two htmdred miles
Ol." lll0r'6 from every coast ... J.ine 1 the present f3COUOnliC
value of its resources would be negligible.
If the goal of establishing a meaningful regime is to
be realized, a somewhat restricted national· boundar·y is called
t:

for, and soon.

Under the cLtrrent, law of the seas, nations

may collect the resources of the continental shelf by the
principle of exploitability.

Article 1 of the Convention

on the Continental Shelf reads:
F•or the purpose of these articles, the term
"continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the ex~loita
tion of the natural resources of the said areas.~
~-----

s·-·-··,·c-...

Burnell, p. 1.

9u.N. Document A/Conf. 13/L55, p.l.

Due to current economic pressures the exploitability
principle is being· used to :!.ts fullest, as Norman J.
Padelford concludes:
The search for new supplies of food and natural
resources, for additional trade and security is
fostering fresh activity in the oceru1s as well as
drawing nations lnto closer contact. G:l.ven the differing
outlooks, needs and aspirations of states, it is essential that national policy be prepared to deal with a
variety of contingencies. This leads to speculations on
the models that are available for the guidance of future
marine policy ••• The most obvious course for most states
to take is to extend their national jul sdiction over
wider belts of ocean off their shores.

0

Technology is rapidly making the resources of the
continental shelf available to private companies.

In

addition, entrepreneurs have begun to create other schemes
for using the continental shelf such as building islands
beyond r•ecognized national boundaries.

'.!.'he United States

government bystopping such ventures has, de facto, assumed
jurisdic·tion beyond existing boundaries.

Senator Claiborne

Pell cites an example of this practice:

i

I

I .

:
I

··At a point some 200 miles off the coast of Oregon,
another sea-mount nearly breaks the surface. Here
again a private American company wanted to create an
island, but our Federal Government refused approval •••
our Government, in refusing to give its citizens
permission to ict, is in effect saying that it has
jurisdlction. 1
The question of a fixed definition for national
jurisdiction is both vital and pressing.

The decision

reached on the limits of national jurisdiction will, in

10

Padelford, p. 261.

11u.s., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., lst Sess.
(1968), CXIV, No.4, 5181.
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effect, allocate the available resou.rces of the sea and
determine the importance of any type of ocean regime.
The question of the limits of the territorial sea is
C--~

c

a matter of international law..

Legal maritime boundaries

have historically been an important part of the international
law of the sea.

In attempting to predict "YJhat boundaries t-Jill

be settled on at'the upcoming Conference on the Law of the
Seas, or simply to analyze the current situation, it is
important to note the relationship of international law to
politics~

Urban Whitaker in his book f2_illics

.

~q .I~g!IJU:,

comments on this relationship.
Several t•ules--including the tlu•ee-mile limit and
the rule of. historic bays--have evolved to help
govern the fixing of boundaries 1 but all of them give
way :r•egula:r:•11 to the basic rule that law is subordinate
to politics. 2
To exs.mi.ne, then, the current situation with regard
to establish:tng fixed boundaries one must examine the

poli~

tical interests of the. concerned nations or groups of nat:i.ons.
Primarily, there are two sets of nations \'!Jith directly
opposing interests: the developed versus the developing
nations and the coastal versus the

non~coastal

nations.• The

clash between the two groups of the former pair is best illustrated by the running controversy between the United States
and several La.tin American countries which have claimed exc1usive right over ocean resources within 200 miles from their
shores and have striven to enforce these rights.

The 200-mile

limit is for many developing nations an attempt to protect
12

.
Whitaker, P• 309.
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ocean resources from the hands of the developed countries.
Robert Friedheim has noted the importance of this policy to
the Latin American states.
A number of developing states, especially Latin
American, have pointed out that their territorial
definitions are an lnherent part of their nationalism.
No regime would survive long if it voted contrary to
the national myth ••• What is important is that these
developing states have backed themselves into a corner
on their favorite proposals we ought not to expect
their acceptance of the ensuing convention. · In
summary, \ole ape not going to get sensible solutions to
ocean problems if we force symbol:l.c issues to a Yjte.
Such advice would be a prescription to disaster.
On the other hand, developed nations, such as the

~

---

----
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United States, are not anxious to lose their distant"water
fishing resources • . If the U.S. recognized a 200 mile limit,
it would have to relinquish nearly all

distant~water

fishing.

This sentiment i.s expressed by John Stevenson in a statement
before the United Nations

Co~nittee

on the Peaceful Uses of

the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction (Sea-Bed Committee).
However, the fact that over 80 percent of our
fisheries are off our own coast does not mean that we
are prepared to abandon the remaining
percent, the
distant-water segment of our industry.

s:a

The conflict of interests between coastal and noncoastal states is also an intense problem.

Non-coastal

·states are almost entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the
coastal states for a share of the ocean's resources.

Evan

Luard has outlined the problem well:
l)Friedheim, A Law of the Sea, p. 16.
1
4'U.s. Calls for Prompt Internatlonal Action to Settle
Problems of Law of the Sea, 11 _Th~_,pep£!-rt.m~nt of St.at·e Bul~etin,
LXVII (October, 1972), P• 385.

tt-----
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The second vital question concerns the outer
limit of national control. Here there is an absolute
conflict of interest between the coastal and noncoastal states. 'l'here is a real danger that .the coastal
states, perhaps encouraged by the Latin Anwrican
·example, may increasingly jump on the 200-mile bandwagon
to grab the largest possible proportion of the resources
for themselves. This would largely exclude the noncoastal states from sharing in the benefits, at least
in oil and gas, for the foreseeable future. It will
thus be an interesting test whether some of the bigger
developing countries, such as Brazil, Argentina and
Chile, are willing to show in their polici.es the same
concern for small and poor neighbors that they demand
the rich countries show them. ~

l.-2----

~------

~=
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The answer to the question of whether the large
developing countries will be willing to help the poorer

~----·-~

-------------------

land-locked nations by abandoning a 200 mile limit might be
inferred from the stubbornness of these nations to compromise
on this issue.

As

an example, consider the following state-·

ment by Hr. Saraiva Guerre.i.ro (representative from Brazil)
before the Sea-Bed Committee:

;f-- It has been claimed that the adoption by coastal
states of a 200-mile tel"•ri torial sea would be disasterotls,r-f'or international trade, as if it would necessarily
p_..-----·)
follow that those States would harrass merchant shipping
in their water•s. The fact that the principle of innocent
.
passage had been consistently· and universally respected
sufficed to dlgsolish such figments of over-fertile
imaginationso
'l'he political context of es tabllshing fixed boundaries
for the sea. and the continental shelf is intricate.

Yet it

is further complicated by the dilemma faced by developed
coastal states.
The great· powers, like the United States and the

1.5

Evan 'Laurd, "Who Gets lrJhat on the Seabed?,"
Foreigq Policz IX (Winter, 1972-73), p. 146 •
.16
U.N. Document (A/AC 138/SC II/SH 14), p. 14.
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Soviet Union, find themselves in an ambiguous position.
On the one hand, they favor ·a narrovJ concept of national
jurlsdiction in order to preserve maximmn freedom o·f
the·sea.s for their commerce and their navies. On the
other hand, they covet possession of the resources in
and under the oceans along their lengthy coastlines.
As a ~esult of these conflicting interests, a bewildering variety of national claims of exclusive fishing,
mineral, navigational, and other rights over ne.djacent
water," "territort_'l seas," and "continental shelves"
has proliferated.

~---l
::::;-~----

------
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A probable guess at the outcome of this collage of
political interests is an expanded boundary for the territorial sea to at least 12 miles, a fairly extensive claim to
the continental shelf beyond the 200 meter isobath, and a

"'-='--------

E
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possible concession of expanded-economic zones for countries,
·~·--·····~

such as the-Latin American ones, which have very short
continental shelves.

The1~e

have been several draft conventions for an ocee.n

regime that have suggested various limitations on national
jurisdiction.

The four considered in this paper are the

u.s.

draft, the USSR draft, the Pell draft and the Draft Statute
by Elisabeth Borgese.

All of these parties favor a 12 mlle

limit on the terri tor:1.al sea.; however, the proposals for
limits o.n the continental shelf vary considerably.

The Pell

draft is most considerate to coastal states proposing a. limit
at a depth of 600 meters.

This limit, however, creates a high

~==-=---=--=---::=

degree of difference in the extent of shelf that individual
countries could claim.

As Elisabeth Eorgese has pointed out:
E------

17

Burnell, P• 1.

55
Another point in the Pell Treaty that remains open
·to question is the deflni tion of the ocean floor. 'l'he
Treaty proposes to limit the continental shelf--subject
to the jurisdiction of the coastal State--to a depth of ~
six hundred meters, abolishing the open-endedness of
~.)
the Geneva Convention of 1958 but setting a depth limit ~
that is neither geologically nor politically justifiable~
For some States, with a steep dropping coast line, this
would include an area of less than t\-Jelve mile§; for
others it would extend for hundreds of miles.lo
~

~o-~

P--- ------- \--'----CO----

~----------

Dr. Borgese suggests instead that:
The continental shelf should not extend beyond a
depth of two hundred meters of the superjacent t-Jaters
or a distance of fifty miles from the base line from
which th~ territorial sea is measured, whichever is
1'arther.l9
"'="-----

This proposal is really a minimal one and it is questionable

p
r;

--- ----- -

whether the majority of coastal states would accept it.
The USSR draft has side-stepped the limits :l.ssue.
Consistent with their policy that it is too early to
establish an ocean regime with licensing pol-:ers, the Russians
have cbosen to omit from their draft any proposals on the

limits of the sea-bed.

20

In contrast the
detailed proposal.

u.s.

~------

draft has suggested the most

It provides foi' a limit at a depth of 200

meters but not to exceed 60 nautical miles in width, with
21
In
some exceptions for irregularities in the sea-bed.
addition, the

u.s.

draft suggests the establishment of a

18
· El:i.sabeth M. borgese, The Ocean Regime (Santa
Barbara: Fund for the Republic, Inc., 19b8"J ~· p. 4.
19 Borgese, The. Ocean Regime, P• 10.
20
u.N. Document A/AC 138/43 (1971), p. 2.
21
U.S. Congress, Sena.te, Co~j. ttee on Interior and
Insu.lar Affairs, Issues Related to Es't.ia.blishment of Seaward
Boundar~, Hearing, 9lst Gong., 2nd Sess:-TI970} (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 71.
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trustee system to supervise the exploitation of resources
between the 200 meter isobath and the end of the continental
margin.

Under this system the coastal state would have

control of \-lho exploits resources in the trusteeship area but
the profits would be shared with the international community.

~--
~=~

A- ---------""""---
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This share is proposed to be between one half and two thirds
of the proceeds from resources taken from the trusteeship
area.
A system of graduated jurisdiction, such as that of
the trusteeship proposal, is probably the most feasible
approach to the problem of defining national jurisdiction.
The concept of gradually loosening national control is
essential to a workable internation.al regime for the oceans.
The ideals consistent with existing maritime law. -As
William Griffin has observed::
Traditional maritime law divides ocean space into
four zones in which the coastal state's authoriti
becomes less absolute seaward until it becomes merged
into ••• the freedom o:f the high seas:22
Indeed, graduated jurisdiction may provide a way to
compromise the short-term economic interests of coastal
states, which call for national control of as much of the
continental shelf as possible, with the interests of developing and non-coastal states, as well a.s the interests of the
world community, which wot1ld opt for peaceful and equitable
exploitation of ocean resodrces.

For proponents of a strong

regime that would command control over valuable resources now,
22

William L. Griffin, "The Emerging Law of Ocean
·Space," !he International Lawy~, I (July, 1967), P• 553.

·~
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one can only apologize because politicalli it seems
impossible.

HoHever, if these proponents are willing to

literally give ground in exchange for a strong regime in
,,~

L: -----

deeper water, the future may see a strong regime in control

-------

c___, _ _ _ _ _
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or a considerable amount of valuable resources currently

~

.__"____ --------···· -

unexploitable due to the lack of necessary technology.
Overall, 'these conflicts are the barriers through
which we must pass in ordet• to achieve our goal of
structut•ing a sea regime for the benefit of all mankind •.
As former President Lyndon B. Johnson declared on July 13,

1966::
Under no circumstance, we believe, must we
ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and
mineral wealth to create a new fdrm of colonial
competition among maritime nations. We. must be
careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the
lands under the high seas. !tie must insure that
the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are~ and
remain, the legacy of all human beings~ 3
Scientific Research and

th~Effect§_

of

.T~c}mologx_

The second area for discussion concerns the effects
of oceanographic research and
related to the seas.

tec~~ological

advancements

In many respects the problem of peace-.

fully allocating ocean resources began with
scientific knowledge and subsequent

incr~ased

t~chnological

capacities.

It "tJas scientific inquiry that dis covered the existence of
oil off the coasts of many states.

'l'hat same inquiry

uncovered manganese nodules on the ocean floor.

23

Eichelberger, P•

340.

Due to these
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discoveries efforts were made to create the necessary
technology to exploit these resources.

In this process a

critical international problem is created--how shall these

~

~

resources be allocated?

The conflicts over the political

-----

k

r=---------
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question of allocation have the potential of upsetting world
peace rutd stability.

Scientific research and technological

advancements have become issues in the sea-bed dispute.
The developed states have what amounts to a virtual
monopoly on scientific exploration and new technological
means.

In accordance with their national interests, they are

pursuing the new possibilities of economically extracting
valuable ocean resources. - The developing nations, on the
other hand, have begun to fear a widening gap between them
and the developed countries due to the disadvantaged
technologies of the developing states.
The concez•n expressed by the developing nations is
well founded.

Professor Padelford explains why:

At the same time it is only fair to recognize the
cry uttered by many of the developing countries, which
lack the technology and economic strength to explore
and exploit the sea beds off their shores, that the
present regime of the seas does not allow them equal
opportunity to utilize the ytarine.resources needed for
their own economic growth. 2 ·
As a result of the possible economic bind that many
developing states may be put into, they have reacted against
scientific research itself, fearing a scientific form of
"colonialism. 11

_____ _
this point.
..

Rober~

Friedheim provides the details on
p.-----
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research off the shores of certain coastal states,
to long, onerous applicati~~s for clearance far in
advance of actual cruises.
Indeed scientific communities themselves have become

G

~---

embroiled in conflict over this problem.

The United States

f'--e----~----

c-0
~

~
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oceanographic community, for example, is caught in a conflict
between the interests·of the developing natlons and forceful
interests on the 'domestic scene.

Several spokesman for non-

Western and Latin American states are skeptical about the
motivation and value of scientific research related to the
oceans.

They feel it is dil'•ectly tied to military and

e.:

R-=-~--=-~ -~---=-- -=-

industrial intei•ests which all too often benefit the developed

'

countries at the expense of the developing nations.

28

In short, political ramifications.b.ave begun to upset
previous attitudes toward oceanographic research as neutral
and amoral

Developing nat:i.ons recognize that they

p1~ocess.

cannot compete wlth the developed states in the scientific or
technological arena.

Their hope in the sea- bed con trover·sy

is to establish some .form of redistribution of ocean resoui.. ces
to offset their lack of technological capacities.

Norman

Padelford outlines this situation:
The different capabilities of states to apply
modern technology and engineering to the use of the
oceans r•epresent another dimension of the problem
at the international level, This is expressed in
the demand voiced by many developing countries to
have the United Nations take control of the deep
sea-beds, to license exploitation of mineral
resources found therein, and to require a sharing
either of the resourqes extracted therefrom or of

~
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King, P• 1.
King, P•
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the income receive~ with the poorer countries for
their advancement. 9
The developed states, in contrast, want the opportunity to develop their technological capabilities to exploit

E ----------~---

,>---"----

ocean resources at a profit.

It follows that those countries

~----------

b
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or enterprises engaged in producing systems for ocean
exploitation want their investments protected.

Developed

states i.n general wish to provide such pl,otection for their
nationals.

For instance, the United States Department of

State has issued the following statement:
The Department does not·anticipate any efforts to
discourage u.s. nationals from continuing with their
current exploration plans. In the event that u.s.
nationals should desire to engage in commercial
exploitation prior to the establishment of an internationally agreed regime, we would seek to assure
·
that their activities are conducted in accordance
with relevan-t principles of international law,
including the freedon1 of· the seas and that the
.integrity of their investment receives due Brotection
in any subsequent international agreement. 3
Currently there is little hope for settlement of the
differences between the developed and developing on the
sea-bed issue.

Perhaps the possibility of a sudden techno-

logical break-through that would make many ocean resources
immediately marketable has left both groups ambiguous as to
the direction in which their best interests lie.

For

whatever the reason, a deadlock exists on establishing an
international regime to control ocean resources, a goal all

-

=--'---------=--~
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groups ostensibly favor.

Thus, the question of when, if at

"

all, the regime will be established ls an important one, and
B------
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Padelford, P• 309.
30
.

R~J2..2rt by :t.he S_peclal S9-b .. 9o!Mlitte~- on
Continental Shelf, p. 23.
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the topic of the final sectlon of this chapter •.
TimiRg of the

Regim~
f~

As disc u.s sed previously, the rapid development of

G

-

- -

l·
~
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ocean technology, as well as other factors, have put the sea
regime issue under time pressure.

To achieve the goals that

many of its proponents hope.for, an ocean regime must be
established before wholesale exploitati.on of ocean resources
begins.

Guenter Weissberg has

observed~

Time is of the essence if marlne imperialism,
serious conflict and dangerous competition are to be
avoided5 The existence of many complexities cannot
be denied, but neither can this be regarded as a
unique phenomenon nor an insoluble obstacle. Once
nation ... states come to realise in earnest that in the
f'inal analysis it is in their interest nto avoid a
race to grab and to hold the lands under the high
seas" . as President Johnson phrased it, realistic
legal pr1nciplej cin be developed which will be of
·benefit to all. 1

~--
~--

-·---"---

Despite the urgency that many say is essential to an
effective regime, progress toward its creation is moving very
slowlyo

The question, why are things at a standstill, may

provide some insight into the situation.

Professor Friedheim

feels both the developed and the developing are at fault.
Developed and developing have contributed equally
to this impasse. Both Hill have to contribute to
getting us out. Nevertheless, it is the contention
of this paper tha.t the impasse. should have been
avoided primarily through a more perceptive set of
tactical policies on the part of the developed. The
developed should have been able to foresee in what
direction a UN SeaG·bed Commi t.tee vJOuld go e.nd then have
acted accordingly. Instead, events were allowed to

31Guenter Wei.ssbert, "International Law Meets the

Short-Term National Interest," International Law ~a.raXVIII (January,-i969) 1 P• 101. ·-·
--
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take their course.

32

Professor Fr•iedheim basically makes two asserti·ons;
one, that the developed and developing nations are equal in

.[___:
r~

~

blame for the deadloc,k; and two, that the developed countries

---

L_,_ _ _ _ _ _ _
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should have been able to prevent the impasse.

The second of-

=-------~·----·--·

these assumptions is more of a moralistic statement than an
observation.

Even if the developed states could have

prevented the current stalemate, the more pertinent question
is did they wish to prevent it.

The first of Friedheim's

statements sounds more llke marriage counseling than accurate
political analysis..

The author maintains that it is

primarily the developed countr:tes •that are favored by thestatus quo a..'l'ld, in addition, as time

pas~es

and technology

develops, their position will continue to improve over that
of the developing countries.
considez~

As evidence of this situation

the approach of several key developed states. - The

United States, for example, despite its proposed draft treaty
is actually stalling on this issue.

Senator Pell notes this

situation.
In the United States, the boundary question involves
considerations of national security, of freedom of the
sea, of the varied interests of the oil industry and
of other i.ndustries who may ultimately be mining the
deep sea-bed, all of which are to some degree conflicting. Thus, the Department of State and the
Administration are still, I regret t3 say, pursuing
with vigor their "no policy" policy. 3
A similar attitude has been taken by the Soviet Union.
Their policy has been to suggest that the regime be a

32 Friedheim, Ocean Science, P• 3.
33Borgese, Pacem in Maribus, p. 231

"="-------

~- :· ----~-~~~-----

relatively weak organization, and that its creation ·now
would be a hasty move.

The Soviet position is explained by
~----

Guenter Weissberg:

b

2_:: -------

Mr. L. I. Mendelevich of the U.s.s.R. took a most
restrictive attitude on the Maltese ~roposal and on
the u.s. Plan. After expressing certain platitudesi
he termed the very establishment of the Comwittee
on the oceans "very risky" -and 11 premature."..i4

~=-~-:----==-~
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Ambassador Hendelevich's stand was praised by the representative J'rom

Austral,~a,

Weissberg suggests rJhy.

,. ., ..Australia, with a continental shelf of over one
mflt;t,.on square miles and a govern.ment which has
authorized extensive exploration and exploitation
of the.oil and gas of the_ shelf', praised the ncautious
wisdom" of Ambassador Mendelevich~ a.nd r·egarded his
"warning" against prematur:fJ and ill-advised duplication
as 1ttimely and relevant. n.>.::>
The developing nations, on the other hand, have been•
quite anxious to see the regime established with all delibera·te speed.

Indeed, it was Arvid Pardo of Malta who, in

1967, originally submitted a proposal for the creation of an
ocean regime to the U.N. Genera1Assembly.

In Ambassador

Pardo's statement the importance of immediacy \oJas stressed:
It is, therefore, considered that the time h~s
come to declare the sea-bed and the ocean floor a
common heritage of mankind and that inrraediate steps
should be taken to draft a treaty ~&bodying, inter
a.J~~~ the following principles •••
.
In general, it is the developed countries who ·have
the upper hand on the proposed sea regime.

On the question

of how soon a regime can be established, matters are at a

34vleiss berg, p. 54.
35 weissberg, p. 56.
36
.
.
U.N. Document A/6695 (1967), p. 1.
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stendstill since the status quo largely favors the economic
interests of key developed states.

The preponderance of

oceanographic research and technology adds weight to the

~-

advantage of the developed nations.

.-"

---

- - --- -
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Developing states have created a hindrance to some
ocean research efforts by refusing to cooperate with research
cruises inside their territ6rial waters.

Such action adds

little weight to their political positions.

In the area of

·.~.:,t~~ ;:~.::

national jurisdiction at least some developing cotmtrles
have a v1eapon with which to bargai.n.
mile limit, popularized by Latin

That weapon is the 200

f~erican states~

~

p---=:::::--~--~----~

As

discussed earlier, the "200-mile limit is a sufffcient irritant among some major developed

nat~ons

that it could bring

some compromises on the regime, if those with 200-mile limits
were willing to bargain.

There is some evidence to indicate

that the 200-mile limit states may not be so inclined.

On

the whole then, and not surprisingly, it is the developed

·- _ _ _ _ _ _
G

states who will control to a large extent the timing and
make up of the new regime.

Whether the developing countries

as a whole will be able to force an adequate form of I'edistribution of o6ean resources is questionable at this time9
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PART

III

ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS FOR AN OCEAN REGIME

--
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CHAPTER VI
r~

~----_

POSSIBLE STRUCTURES FOR AN OCEAN REGIME

__

~---------
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Just what kind of organizational status the regime
should h11ve is an interestJ.ng question.

There al"e a number

of possibilities that should be consideredo

It has been

suggested that the regime take the form of an international
corporation.

~---

-

·-

-

-----------------~-

Professor Richard Eells has proposed that the
ocean regime take the form of a multinational corporate
au.thori ty whose stock would be allocated among members ·
of the United Nations according to some formula that
would assure adequate representation to less developed
countries. The corporation would need the moral support
of the United Nations. Stock could ultimately be held
by governments, foundations, or corporations involved
.in the oceans, and .these stockholders would elect a
board of directors to prescribe policies. The corporation vwuld license public or commercial organizations to use resources of the sea, and it would pay
1
dividends to its shareholders after meeting its costs.
Although the idea sounds simplified for the complex
political problems that a regime would have to deal with,
the concept merits considerable attention.

Supporters of

the corporation structure maintain that there is evidence to
that such arrangements can work.

concl~de

To the argument that international organizations
lack experience in operating enterprises, there is
the answer that they are already carrying on successful banking and financing operations through the
International Bank. for Reconstruction and JiJevelopment
(World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund.
vfuy should not a. corporate subsidiary of a.n ocean
~------

1

Burnell, p .. ·4•
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regime beco2e equally successful in
operations?
1-Jhi le it is true that the

~·:ox•ld

indu~trlal

Bank and the Inter-

national Monetary Fund are working examples of the structure

~----

~

p ----

------
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suggested by Professor Eells, one must ask if these organi-

d _ --------r"
t-- ~

"--"··------- _"

___ _

zations could function in a more intense environment of
political conflict.

Certainly the proposed regime carries

such an environment, but the answer to this question lies
outside the scope of this paper.

It is only mentioned here

as an interesting possibility.
~-~-

second possible form for the ocean regime is

A

proposed by Norman J. Padelford:
One alternative for coping with maritime issues
is to utilize the community con_cept as has been developed
among the six Western-European states who have joined
to form the Conrrnon Market. The Common Market rests
upon the principle ·that mutual concern for a particular
situation or set of problems gives rise, under
appropriate circumstances, to a sense of con~unity •••
Perhaps eventually state~ will be agreeable to
forming similar institutions for regulating use of the
oceans. 3
.
The principle of.mutual concern to which Professor Padelford
refers is basic to the working of any international agreement,
and it has worked extremely well in the European Economic
Community.

The key to its success is pinpointed by Mr.

Scheingold when he statest

"In its most general form the

lesson of the Buropean Community is in its capacity as a
functional regime to concert national policy on matters of
2

3

Burnell, p. ;;.
Padelford,

p~

272.
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_:4

real economic

~lv!porte.nce. 11

Mutual concern and a concert of

national goals is exactly Hhat is needed for an international
regime to control ocean resources.

These elements are to be

,_
f"·

.found in the st:r•uc tui•e of the European Corrummi ty.

The rJOrld

'"------_ - _
~----

~------------r--~

community, on the other hand, simply does not share the same
common ground that the European Community has been able to
build.

Indeed, an analogy between the 't'lOrld ,community and

Europe must leave one a little cold.
The European Community vJa.s created ou:t of a widely
shared sense of common crisis. At the cl.ose of World
War II much of Europe lay in ruins; the poli.tical
systems of the individual states \>mre in shambles; and
confidence in the nation-state as a source of security,
welfare and d§mocratic values was, to say the least,
badly shaken • .?
While the success of the European C_ormnunity should serve as
an inspiration to those working for an effective regime of
the

se~,

its particular situation has little relevance.
Thirdly, we must ask what relationship should the

ocean regime have to the United Nations?.

Clearly to tie it

directly to a U.N. organ such as the Security Councll or the
General Assembly or both would not works

'11hese organs have

developed the function, inter alia, of an international
sounding-board.

If they were given direct responDibility

for the ocean regime, its functioning vJould become secondary
to international rhetoric a.nd political shifting.

!--:
=~------"-"·---·

There are many U.N. subsidiary organizations that
have functions defined in separate agreements..

4P..orgese, Pacem_ln

.M.~ibu.s,

p. 215 ...

.5Borgese, Pacem in

Mar:i.bu~,

p. 219.

The Report of
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the Sea-Bed Committee cites some examples:
A number of United Nations' subsidlary organs
perform functions which are defined in international
agreements, particular examples being the bodies
concerned with narcotic drugs and the Offlce of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
In the case of the Office of UNHCR, the Office was
created by the General Assemgly and given functions .
under a separate convention.
·

f-;>

~-----

·P--=--------t::~
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The ocean regime should be functionally separated
from the United Nations but it should also hold·a relationship to it.

Elisabeth Borgese has expressed this view by

saying:·
:::

The regime must be independent from the United
Nations--like the World Bank or the International
Atomic Energy Agency--yet it must be in someway
connected with it; it must emanate from it; it must
be legitimized by it. 7

--

~ ~---~~--------

The U.,N. blessing should be encouraged if for no other
reason than to help enhance the universality of acceptance
for the ocean regime.
What organizational substructure should the ocean
regime have?

"The Study on-International Machineryn makes

the .following observation in regard to the regime's structure:
The organization would have an organ in which all
the members would be represented, whose purposes would
be to establish policy and give direction to the .
organization; an organ of more restricted membership
to examine, recommend or decide on questions of
granting of licenses ••• possibly one or more technical
or scientific organs of an advisory nature; and a
secretariat. An organ designed to hage some functions
in respect of settlement of disputes.

6
P• 229.

U.N. Document A/7622 (1970), p. 123.
7Borgese, TQli~~d an .~nternational Ocean

Regim~,

8
U.N. Document A/AC 138/23, (1970), p. 32.
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Most of the regime proposals have adopted this design.
Basically, the suggested structure is patterned after that of
the United Nations.

Organs resembling the General .Assembly,
c_ ----------L _ _ __

Security Council, Secretariat, International Court of Justice

=-------

[=_:_ __
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and the Specialized Agencies appear in virtually all the
proposed regimes.

Such an arrangement, reflecting the

structural pattern of the U.N.,makes sense because it is
one that all nations are familiar with and somewhat comfortable about.

The assembly should provide for even

geographical distribution of its membership.

Elisabeth

~·-·

c-

-

-----------------

Borgese has suggested that the assembly consist of four
chambers, one for

repr~sentatives

from nation-states, one for

representatives from the international mining corporations,
one for fishing organizatlons and one for sc·ientis ts.

Whlle

the idea of including representatives from cownercial and
scientific interests is an excellent one and should be
utilized, it would not be wise to allow them, collectively,
to dominate the assembly's membership.

An assembly with a

broad geographical and political cross-sectlon that also
includes representatives from related interests, but in
smaller proportions than to nation-states, would be more
acceptable.
The council or executive board, as the Russians have
called it, should represent by permanent membership the most
developed countries.

~t

~-==----=-=~=

"

should also provide for membership

of the var•ious interest group nations, i.e. land-locked and

----~

shelf-locked states as well as coastal

de~ef.oping

countries.

The Russian draft... ca.lls for an Executive Board of the

72
foll.ol-1ing- composition:
The executive Board shall consist of thirty States.
-The Board shall accordingly include five states from
each of the following group~ of countries:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

the Socialist countries;
the countries of Asia;
the countries of Afr:I.ca;
the countries of Latin America;
the western European and other countries not coming
within the categories specified in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) of this paragraph and;
one land-locked country frof1 each of the aforementioned groups of States.

Ei ________
L---[::"-----...... - - - - - -

----

h
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While this adequately provides for a good geographi ...
cal distribution and for land-locked representation, it is
def'initely weighted toward Russian interests.

r::

~--==-~==

--------

Clearly, if

six socialist countries are present at least one of them would
reflect Soviet interests; on the other hand, it would be
entirely possible that

u.s.

interests under this arrangement

would go unrepresented.
The U.S·. draft contains a more realistic proposal.
Article 36 reads:
2. Members of the Council shall be deslgnated or
elected in the following categories:

a.
b.

The six most industrially advanced Contracting
Parties shall be designated in accordance with
Appendix E;
Eighteen additional Contracting Parties, of whtch
at least twelve shall be developing countries,
shall be elected by the Assembly, taking into acc£bmt
the need for equitable geographical distribution.
The most industrially advanced nations referred to

;;;;::-=--==--==
- -

in Article 36 would be determined by the six highest gross

9

U.N. Docwnent A/AC 138/43, p. ?.
10
.
~~£2!~ by the Special Sub-committee
Continental Shelf, p. 77.
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national products.

Thus both su.perpowers would be perma-

nently represented•
The exact membership of the court and secretariat is

~

P------

not dealt with extensively by the various drafts, although

-----

~=-----======
~---
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~~

they do generally suggest equitable geographical distribution.
The application of this principle to the

staf~ing

------ ·---·---·-··

of the

secretariat raises the question of quality in regard to
secretariat personnel.
Because the secretariat of' an ocean regime should be
of high quality and because the type of background that
would be required is not likely. to be common, it would seem
impossible to have both a quality staffing of the secretariat
and equal geographical distribution..

Richard Symonds in an

article enti.tled "li1unctional Agencies and International
Administration", has summed up the problem thus:
The reality of 'equitable geographical distribution'
in recruitment has to be faced. Its application has led
to a decline in standards, but member staiis are likely
to continue to insist. on its a.pplication ..
· Since the council of the proposed regime is, in
almost all the draft, statutes, the focus of power and
decision-making, its voting procedure :l.s critical.

Evan

Laurd has noted this and offered a solution:
More difficult problems surround the nature of
the international regime. First, the authority clearly
cannot be established on the.basis of majority voting
a.nd one nation-one vote {if only because the big
powers would not enter at all on this basis); but nor
should any nation or small group of them (as under the
U.S. proposal) exercise a veto~ The simplest solution
is to have a council of perhaps 30 nations, elected
on the basis of geographic representation, and including

11
Jordan, P• 113.

u
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adequate representation for non-coastal states, and to
require, say, a four-fifths majority for .any dec;l.sion.
This would maximize 1 2onsensus without allow:i.ng vetoes
or weighting votes.
The elimination of the veto as suggested above seems
to be an honorable goal.

However, the suggested solution

cited above will not do.

Any body that does not insure, not

only the

represe~tation

,,

~

-------- ------
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of the superpowers but also the

serving of their interests, will eventually fail.

If, for

example, the council of 30 nations were to make a decision
directly in conflict \>lith Soviet interests, the USSR could
simply refuse to comply.

If the Soviet Union (or any other

major power) in such an instance decided to leave the regime
and car•ry on exploitation activities as a. non-member state,
the ver·y purpose of the regime would be defeated.

One might

reply that dtte to the required four-fifths majority the
interests of the major powers would not be contra.dictedo
One should then ask what is· the difference between this
proposal and a system including a veto for major

powers~

While the USSR draft calls for what amounts to a:veto
for all members, the

u.s.

\

proposal establishes a system under ·

which any three major powers could by voting together,
exercise a veto.

Article 23 of the Russian draft reads:

Decisions of the Executive Board on questions
of substance shall be made by agreement; decisions
on procedural questions shall be made by the ma.:tority
of the mem.ber•s of the Board present and voting. ,;
While Article 38 of the
12

13

u.s.

working paper states: "Decisions

.
Laurd, p. 145.

U.N. Document A/AC 138/43, P• 8.

~
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by the Council shall require approval by a majority of all
ita members, including a majority of members in each of the
two categories referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 36. 11

14
~

In the

u.s.

draft a majority of the first category of six

members is four, thus three can veto.

-----

~~-------------

It seems unlikely that

·a council without some form of veto for the·major powers
would.be universally accepted ..
The problem of financing the ocean regime is a
critical part of its structural setup.
many monetary possibilities.

There are a great

It is, however, too early to

predict with any accuracy which method will best fulfill the
political needs present at the time the ftnancial decision
is made.

If the new regime follows existing patterns for

financing UN organi.zations, several options are available.
Existing UN

ol~ganization

are normally financed by one

of the following three methods:
1.

All expenses are provided for in the regular UN
budget, e.g. UNCTAD,

2.

All expenses·a:re bol"'ne by voluntary contributions,
e.g. UNITAR and UNICEF,

3.

The organization is financed by both the UN and
voluntary contribution, e.g. UNIDO and UNHCR.

However, the specialized agencies in the UN follow a
separate route.

Each agency makes-up its own annual budget,

and this is then repor.ted to the General Assembly for

14R~port

by the S.Pe.ci.al
Continental Shelf, p. 78.

Sub-cs_~1~tt~~-9..n Out~
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recommendations..

Each agency has a separate financial

agreement with the UN differing in

v~rious

degrees.

In case
~------

of IBRD and IMF, hmvever, the UN has no control over the
agency budgets and the appropriate authorities enjoy full
autonomy in decid1.ng the form and content or the budget.

-~---~~

Both

c-----

IBRD and IMF are financially self sufficient organizations.
As we have already seen,existing structural patterns
will probably hold little relevance to .the proposed regime
due to its unique character and indicated function.

As a

result, some nations have suggested new methods of financing
the regime.
1.

For example, Tanzania has proposed the following:
Initial costs will be borne by the members of
the Authority according to the scales established
by the executive council,

2.

Income received in excess of administrative and
other costs will be distributed equitably by the
1
Assembly to the member states. 5

Similar financial arrangements have been proposed by
Canada, Poland, and others.

The United Kingdom, for example,
16
has suggested t.hat the authority should be self-financing.
Underlying the,.above suggestions for financing the regime is
the assumption that the regime 'will control, to some degree
at least, a sizable amount of wealth in ocean resources.

If

this assumption is correct, one of. the regime's major
functions will be to redistribute therevenue gained from
ocean resources.
1

5u .N.

16

This particular.function.is considered in·

Document A/AC 138/33 ( 1971.) •

u.N. Document A/AC 138/46 (1971) •
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greater detail in the following chapter.
tional question
be put?

is~

However,
an addi···-, ...

to what other uses should regime receipts

There have been three main suggestions.

1.

'I'hey are:

~--

---- - - ---

~

A proportion of the revenue should be reserved
for projects which contribute to the development
i

of the sea-bed as the common heritage of mankind.
2.

Conservation schemes and projects sponsored by.
regional offices of the Authority.

) •. Due regard for training personnel and allocating
revenue for underdeveloped nations should be

~---

given.
~-

---

------

The appropriate financial arrangement will depend
upon the functions and powers deleg.ated to the regime •.
Optimistically, it is hoped .that th(1 regime can be selfsuff-icient.

If properly arranged revenues

~rom

licensing,

royalties, and membership dues and/or contributions will
provide adequate monetary resources.

Finally, and somewhat

-~----

idealistically, it is hoped that some significant amount of
economic redistribution can be maintained to compensate those
developing states· whose economics may be jeopardized by a
flood of ocean minerals.
The importance of a constructive agreement on an
ocean regime has led some observers to look for analogous
patterns .in the form of existing treaties.

Two treaties offer

limited relevance t·o a new regime of the sea.

They are the

Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Treaty Governing Exploration
of Outer Space, 1966. · Eoth treaties attempt to form mutually
.acceptable patterns of national behavior in areas lacking

===

"i'
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sovereign territorial claimse ·aoth

treatie~

provide for

peaceful uses, a prohibition on nuclear arms and cooperation
in, and freedom of, scientific research.

Beyond the points

mentioned above however, these treaties offer little guidance

~
~------~

.. _ __

for an ocean regime.
The Antarctic Treaty is based upon the territorial

,~

:
- - -

principle of res'nullius, (territory belonging to no one) and
as such the Antarctic is still available for claims of
territoriality through prescription or othe:P legal means.
Applied to the oceans the principle of

~~~~

would

escalate the possibility of conflict.

Such an approach to
~

- - ------- - - - - -

the territoriality of the sea has not been seriously
suggested since the seventeenth century when Hugo Grotius and
John Seldon staged thei.r classic debate over the law of ·the
sea.

Grotius proposed a doctrine of

~

while Seldon proposed mare clausu.m (closed sea).

(free sea)
Grotius 1

mare liberum was the forerunner of the modern freedom of the
seas doctrine.

·----

The Outer Space Treaty, as opposed to the Antarctic
Treaty, is based on the principle
owned by all nations).

of~

(territory

This principle does create an analo-

gous situation to the ocean regime.

Proposals for the regime ·

have all been based on the concept of res communis for oceanspace beyond national jurisdiction.

The phrase which is

widely employed in draft treaties for the ocean a.nd embodies
the res

comm~

--------

idea is the "common heritage" principle.

rrhe similarities and differences between the
· Antarctic and Space Treaties and the proposed ocean regime

79

are however superficial.

The proposed regime is a unique

and fundamente.lly new a tt.empt in interna tion~.l relations.
The regime proposals suggest establishing internatibnal

"'="'-'---"

--

~--

- - - - --------

machinery to control and distribute natural resources, a
=---~---~

~~~~~-

runction which is a long stride beyond res communis.

Because

the regime is a new and unique idea there is no point in
trying to find workable patterns for it in past international
agreements.

The "international ship of' state" must sail into

unchartered waters to reach agreement on a meaningful regime,
its

captain cannot steer a true course by consulting a map

of outer space.

=--------

CHAPTER VII
=~~

FUNCTIONS AND PO\-iEHS OF THE REGIVili

::
R-----s

The proposal to establish an international regime to
control the resources of the sea-bed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction has virtually universal support from
the nations of the world.

There is general agreement on

many basic principles upon which such a regime should be
founded.

-~~~

The principles· enjoying a general consensus include:
~

--------------

the use of the sea-bed

fo~

peaceful purposes, using sea-bed

resources for the benefit of mankind, allowing freedom of
scientific research, maintaining the freedom of the high seas,
and prevention and control of pollution.

To assume a true

consensus based on this ostensible homogeneity is to be
misled.

The attempted application of these principles in

------

various draft proposals has uncovered a list of controversial
~C--~~

issues centered around the possible functions and poto1ers of
an ocean regime.

Three issues have been sele.cted for

discussion= the extent of the regime's power, the financial
powers of collecting and redistributing money, and finally
the role of enforcement in the settlement of disputeso
'!'he Sea-Bed Committee in a. report ?alled "Study on
1
International Machiner!'' lists· four possible types of
internationalmachinery.
1

Varying in power from weakest to

U.N. Document (A/AC 138/23), p. 17.
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strongest they are:

(1) international machinery for exchange

of information and preparation of studies; (2) international
machinery with intermediate pov.Jers; (J) international machinery for

registration~d

~:-

__ --------

- - - --

l

·licensing; and (4) international

machinery having comprehensive powers.

By process of.

elimination the above list can be narrowed quick1y.

~---

The

grant of' power Ul'lder ( 1) and ( 2) is too weak to consider the
machinery a regime at all.

~~he

proposal under (4), machinery

having comprehensive powers, would include the power of the
organization to engage in direct exploitation activities.
Unfortunately, such a. regime is currently politically
·- --------------

impossible, since no major nation supports it.

Mr. Vincent

McKelvey, U oS. representative to the Sea-Bed Committee, made
the followlng statement before the Committee:Our debate .has also b~ought out so~e s~ggested
forms and functions of international machinery that
my Government does not believe vJOuld serve our funda~
mental objectives of developing sea-bed· resources for
the benefit of all manklnd. I refer in particular
to the suggestions that sea-bed exploration ou~ht to
be .undertaken b2 an international operating
organization •••
Thus, we are left with the third alternative, a
system f'or registration and licensing.

Most of the draft

proposals assume this level of power for the international
~egime.

Senator

~ell's

proposal calls for a licensing

authority designated by the United Nations with the approval
of the Security Council.

Such an arra.ngement would clearly

reflect the political realities involved, but it is likely
2

"August Session of U.N. Sea-bed Committee Held at
New Yot•k," The Department of St8te Bulletln, LXI (September,

1967), P• 2"86;
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that this direct tie-irt with the U.N. would encourage the
use of the licensing system a.s a "political i'ootbe.ll."

A

separate system not tied directly to-the United Nations or
the Security Council might avoid
The

u.s .

s~ch

c~---

---

a problem.

working paper calls for the esta.blislunent of

,,

a trusteeship to control registration and licensing in the
·area between the limits of national jurisdiction and the end
of the continental margin.

Basically th:is means the coastal

state will control the licensing in this area.
truste~~hip

zone the Lnternational

(ISRA) would control licensing.

~ea-Bed

Beyond the

Resource Authority

However, the ISRA cannot

bypass national control completely and carry on exploitation
on their own.

Appendix A of the

u.s.

draft proposal outlines

the procedures for obtaining an exploitation license.

In all

cases private companies must work through an "Authorizing or
Sponsoring Party 11 which would be a national government by
definition. 3

This procedui•e amounts to a system of "double

concession" which is defined in the "Study on International
Machinery. 11
It was suggested that a double conc~ssion system
might be established, so that the ·international
authority would grant licenses to a State which would
act as a sort of "administering a.uthority 11 in respect
of the sublipenses they might in tur•n grant to
enterprises.4This approach has been.strongly criticized by Evan
~
-------

Laurd.
3 Re12.ort 'l?~~he Special Sub-comrni ttee on Outer
Gontinentil Shelf,!). 71:

4u.N. Document A/AC 138/23,

p. 37.

-----

It is widely assumed that licensing tV'ill be direct
to goverrnnen.ts, Hh.tch 1t1i 11 then themsel ve:s license
companies.. r.i:J:lls 'reflects the fact that i.t iS governments' that are deciding the question. Butt it is in
f'a.ct the wcr..st posstble system. It would provide a
multiplicity .of separate regulations and juri~dictions
in a peculiar patch\-Jork all over the sea-bed.--'

""

~----
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Elisabeth Borgese, in hel"' proposed draf't, suggests

~

--

direct licenslng from the regime authority to "Nember States•"
and to international organizations and corporations.

This

direct procedure would be superior to a system of double
concession.
Again; unfortunately, a direct l:tcens.ing procedure
does not seem politically feasible at this time.

~---

Despite the

fact that the major pol-Jers are \·Jilling tel renounce any claim
by a nation-state to any part of the deep sea-bed area, still
they are unv1illing to allow an international regime to assume
sovereign control.

As Norman J. Padelford has observed:

Thus :rar neither the United States nor other
principal powers. are convinced that control of the
seas should be conferred upon an international body.
Nor are they ready to endow an organization with
supra-national authority to dictate marine activities. Enlightened conceptions of ngtional interest
remain the surest guide for policy.

·------··--

"""

This reluctance seems almost contradictory with the
articles proposed by major powers renouncing sovereign
claims.

For example the Russian draft Article 5 st.ates:

No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part of the sea-bed or the
sub-soil thereof. States Parties to this Treaty
shall not recognize any such claim or exercise of
sovereignty or sovereign rights.

5
6

Laurd, p. 145.
..
Padelford, P• 273.
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Similiarly, the sea-bed and the sub-soil thereof
shall not be subject to appropriation by any means, ·
by States or persons, natural or juridi.cial. 7
.
while the u.s. draft states:
'.

No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over any part of the International
Sea-bed Area or its resources. Each Contracting
Party agrees not to recognize any such claim or
exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights. 8
Yet

u.s.

~=::_-_~.-==:::_c-=_~=

,._;

''
'

r _ __

Representative, John Stevenson, made the followipg

statement before· the Sea-bed Committee:
Accordingly, we believe it is important to dispel
any possible misconceptions that my government would
agree to a monopoly by an international operating
agency over deep sea-bed exploitation or to any type
of economic zone that does .not accommodate bas.ic ·
United States interest~ with respect to resources
as well as navigation.
Indeed·it will be difficult. enough f'or the u.s.
adm:i.nistration to continue to support its own proposal, in
light of Congressional.disa.pproval, let alone attempting to
suggest an increase in power for a proposed regime&

Ih

hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, the regime was referred to as "a sort of floating
Chinese pagoda."

10

The reason some Senators objected is due

to domestic pressures, primarily from the hard mineral mining
companies.
In the final analysis the extent of the international

7

u.N. Document A/AC 138/43, p. 2.

8

Report by tH~Special Sub-corr~ittee on Outer
Continental Shelf, p. 71.
9
u.N. Document A/7622, P• 383.
10Report by the Special Sub-committee on Outer
·Co.ntinental_§he1,£, p. 2.5.

ii

e ...

8.5
regime's power will depend more on its universality of
acceptance than any specific licensing procedure.

A non\=l

member state would not be bound by the treaty establishing a

--------

~---

regime.

"Assuming that a particular State did not' accept
~

- - -

any rights or obligations under the treaty, its activities
would be based on existing customary and conventional law."

11

And it is the inadequacy of the existing customary and
conventional law that makes the proposed regime desirable and
necessary.
· The second issue for discussion is that of the
financial pot-Jer of the proposed regime both for collecting
· f'unds and redistributing them.

The collect. ion of funds for

the regime authority could come.from a number of different
soul'•ces.

The U.s. draft has explored this area in some

deta·il.

It sugg"'sts one, a license fee of f:t'om $5,000 to

$15,000 per block of exploitable area (of which a portion

between one half and two thirds would be forwarded to the
· ISRA); two, a rental fee beginning in the third year after a
licens.e is given and prior to commercial production; three,
payments on production including a $500 1 000 to $2,000,000
bonus payment.

Thus, resource exploiters, under the

dl"aft would pay license, rental, and royalty fees.

u.s.
Such a

system would produce considerable income for the regime.
The concept of graduated jurisdiction discussed in
Chapter V and proposed. in the

u.s.

draft in the form of zones

of waning national control, will help in the system of
11

u.N.

Document A/7622, p. 161.
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collectlon and redist.ribLttion of funds.
succinctly described by Evan

This advantage is

Laurd~

Harder still are the questions relating to the
scale of royalties and the system of redistribution.
There is a lot to be said for the intermediate zone
system suggested by the United States and Malta.
This zone might stretch from 50 to 100 mi.les from
the coast~ in it the coastal state would retain some
degree of control but would pay a considerable part
of the royalties to the international authority.
The effect is to reduce.the sharp division between
the national and the international area. This lessens
conflicts on boundaries by asking coastal states to
share resou1"es, rather than to forego them
altogether~ '
.
·

ic

,.....,.---------

P,------

~------~

~

-----------

Under the trusteeship arrangement the ISRA would
receive a substantial part of the proceeds from the
·ship area.

50%

trustee~

The actual percentage is suggested at betl-Jeen

and 66 2/3% of the total.

The proposed syste~ of

.collection and redistribution presented in the UGSs working
paper is the most specific guide suggested to date.·
The i'inal issue to be discussed is the role of
enforcement in the settlement of disputes related to the
proposed lnternational regime. ·Most of the proposals
include some form of organization to settle disputes.

The

Pell proposal provides for a review panel to hear the dispute
with the possibility of appeal to the International Court of
Justice.

The

jurisdictlon.

u.s.

draft calls for a tribunal of final

Whatever the structure, the key question is

what type of enforcement can be used?

Senator Pell has

------------

called for the establishment of a Sea Guard, under the
control of the Security Council.

The Sea Guard is described

bL
~--_

·--

12

Laurd, p.

145.

-

in the following terms:: ·
In order to promote the objectives and ensure the
observance of the provisio.ns set forth in this Treaty,
States Parties to the Treaty agree that there shall
be established as a. nermanent force a Sea Guard of
the United Nations which rnay take such action as may
be necessary to maintain and enforce international
compliance ~-Jith these principles ••• The Sea Guard shall
be under the co~ijrol of the Security Council of the
United Nations.·J
·

R------

~----

~

r"---

Enforcement under this suggestion 140uld rest on the
workability of and principle of collective security in the
Security Council.

This has been demonstrated to be more a

matter of selective security than a reliable form of enforce ...
ment:
If a Contracting Party fails to perform the
obligations incumbent upon it under a jud~nent
rendered by the Tribunal, the other Party to the case
may have recoLlrse to the Council, which shall decide
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. Wnen appropriate,· the Council may decide to
suspend temporarily, in whole or in part, the rights
undez> this Convention of the Party failing to perform
its obligations, withoLlt ;impairing the rights of
licensees who have not contributed to the failure to
perform such obligations. The extent of such a
suspension should be related fP. the extent and
seriousness of the violation. 4
The pz>oblem is, of course, that once a member state's
rights were suspended, no reason would exist for him to honor
the treaty obligationso

Thus, he could easily justify

defiance of the treaty,as a non-member state.

The

u.s.

working paper has no suggestions foz> enforcing treaty
obligations on non-member states. · This reinforces the
1 3congressional Recoz>d• CXIV, :p. 5184.
1

·
~eport b;;c the Special SLlb-committee __££!
Continental Shelf, p. 62 •. ·

Oq~~

---
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importance of universal acceptance ofwhatever treaty is
finally drafted.

This is noted in the "Study on Inter-·
~-

·---

national Machinery":
It would hardly be poss:tble from a legal standpoint to enforce decisions of the international
machinery Y..~~-:a-v1:_~ third States. Even if the
concept of the establishment of an 'objective regime'
were generally accepted, there would be practical
difficulties,as regards those States which did not
agree to the applicability of the concept. The
possibility of the use of force with respect to such
States should be excluded •••• In order, therefore 1
to ensure fully effective functioning of international
machinery of the type in question, it would be highly
important; to ensure uni ve1ga1 participation in the
regime to be established.
.

§_ _ _
F;

Enforcement of a treaty to establish a regime· to
·control the resources of the sea beyond national jurisdiction
·will have to depend upon.the principle of reciprocity like
any other international agreement.
An additionalproblem related to enforcement concerns
the need for some form of control over multinational corporations that have financial interests in ocean resources.
· This need should be of obvious importance since large
corporatlons 1 such as the Hughe·s Tool Company, are developing
the capability of exploiting manganese nodules, while the
large oil companies are becoming increasingly interested in
off'sho1•e oil deposits.

It was concern over premature

exploitation of ocean wealth that led to the Moritorium

-----

Resolution discussed earlier.

~:_:__-

It see1ns clear that unrestricted exploitation of sea.
minerals without some international agreement of regulation

l5u.N. Document A/AC 1.38/23, p. 62.
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is undesirable.

Even after a regime is established multi-·

national industries are likely to cause problems.

Almost all
~---

enforcement clauses in the current draft proposals deal
6~---==

directly Hith nation-states,· assuming that the nation-states

--

-------~-·--·--

s-~~~-

will, in turn, control their own private industry.;

However,

!:_~

~

large corporations which are international in scope may well
elude such control by ·shifting their base of operations to
the country or countries most amiable to their· wishes to
exploit ocean resources.

This type of industrial competition

could undermine the entire regimeo
Indee¢1 the problem of competition among developtng
states for foreign investment is not a new one·to the inter"'
national community.
It must be remembered that although a host country
has the right to be as strict as it considers appropriate
\-Jhen a multinational corporation operates in its
territory, it cannot force a multinational corporation
to locate its activities there. The key consideration
is that there are often other countries vJhich are eager
to offer more attractive conditions. Indeed, in a
number of countries, especially those vJi th a federal
form of government, various loca~ and provincial
authorities outbid one anotherol
If these problems exist in a system of clearly defined
national boundaries they can ·only be intensified vJhen related
to the sea regime and the uncertainty that surrounds national
ownership of ocean resources.
The most significant concern related to multinational
corporations and the ocean regime is the possibility that,

16

"Report on Multinational Corporations in World
Development," International Legal Material~, XII (September,
1973), P• 1130.
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due to the unique and disputed jurisdictional. situation of
the sea regime, corporations may develop
national in character.
International LE;3gal

th~t

are supra-

A recent study published in

Materi~~- ha~

addressed this conce1..n.

Recent proposals for the creat:ton of an international·
authority for the regulation or exploration of resources
of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction indicatE] further poss:lbilities for the creation of
supranational machinery~ These proposals also indicate
difficult problems of control. rrhe pending negotiations
with l~espect to the sea-bed \vould thus thrm¥ light o~
possible arrangements concerning the creation of
supra~~tional corpo1•ations or machinery dealing with
them. 1
·

~·--

---------

~
·c------------

~-------

-----

Although a full discussion of the special problems
posed by multinational corporations is beyond the scope of
this thesis it is important to note the signi.ficance of the
situation.

The existence of such industry and the increasing

three.t of full scale exploitation of ocean wealth is
multiplying the n.eed for rapid agreement by the international
con~unity

on a workable ocean regime to avoid the possibility

of conflict.

It also calls for careful preparation in

drafting the agreement for an ocean regime.

The regime must

make allo't-Jances for and be able to deal with the problems
posed by multinational corporations.
The various proposals fox• the establishment of an
ocean regime have provided an interesting and informative
backdrop on which to consider the political feasibility of
~=----

such a regime.

Currently the regime faces stalling tactics

on the part of many nations who are uncertain that

---------------17

rnte~national.Legal

b'--------

Materials, p. 1126.
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international regulation now would be to their economic
advantage.

Thus, there is cause for pessimism.

Everyone
t:: - - - -- ---------

recognizes that frantic, uncontrolled exploitation of ocean
p

resources would be a detriment to all, but many wish to wait
until the situation gets worse before they act.

Arvid Pardo

s------~---=-

--

,,E--~-------

has commented:
International management of the oceans and the:l.r
resources may be necessary in the interests of all;
but, until present chaos is further eompounded, unt:i.l
ocean living resources are seen globally to become
scarcer, and until the ecology of the oceans is
visibly a.nd gravely impaired over the greater part
of our planet, it is .to be feared that states will
prefer to continue lJi th the present system, seeking
to mitigate the negative effects of absence of
authol.. ity and uncontrolled use by bringing er.sr wider
areas of the seas under national reg1,;1lation. ·
Of the various proposals presented the UoS. draft· is
the most detailed and

~ealistic.

It provides for a- structure

patterned after the United Nations.

It also has prescribed

a fairly realistic set of functions and powers to that
structure.

It has utilized, through the trusteeship idea,

the concept of graduated jurisdiction vJhich will be essential
to the success of an ocean regime.

One·must ask, what is the

possibility of near universal acceptance of the
Apparently the outlook is gloomy.
the Pacem in

Maribu~

u.s.

draft?

John Frohnmayer reports on

Convocation::

'l'he Pacem in Haribus Convocation at Halta in the

fall of 1970 provided a forum for some of the first
national reactions to the Nixon Proposal. None of the
fifty-one nations represented at the convocation
expressed support for the proposal, and Dr. Ebrgese

18

Arvid Pardo, "Development of Ocean Space -- An
International Dilemma,'' Louisiana La1t~ ..R..£.Yif?_'!, XXXI ( 1970-71),
. P•

52.

--

·----
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conc1udei·that if the reaction of these nations
serves as a barometer, the Nixon Proposal has litt1!
chance of effective support in the world community. 9
19

.
John E. Frolmmayer, "The Nixon P~oposa1 for an
International Sea-bed Authority'', Oregon Law R~view L
(October, 1971), p. 616.
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CHAPTER VIII
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CONCLUSION
-----

At the outset of this thesis two sets of related
conflicts were discussed: the struggle between man and his
environment and the struggle among nations.

The movement to

establish a regime to participate in the allocation of ocean
resources among nations reflects both struggles.

In the

li _ __

first case, modern society has become increasingly dependent
upon raw materials and inexpensive fossil fuels.

The ocean

offers the last untapped reservoir of .these resources.
Historical patterns of

~xplbitation

of natural resources

have· sho1-m the underlying assumption that ra-vJ materials are
inexhaustible.

The oceans have been called the "last

frontier", and it is perhaps from this facade that ocean
wealth may be considered inexhaustible, just as fresh land
once seemed endless during the westward movement of American
·history.

However, maritime reserves t-Jill not be omnipresent

if rapidly and wastefully exploi.ted.

The following quotation

provides a stirring perspective from which to view the
longevity of resources from our "last frontier":
The seas seem immense, and it is sobering to view
them as did Jacques Cousteau at ·a recent meeting of
students, when he pointed out that if the earth were
to be viewed as the size of an egg, all the oceans
taken together would constitute only a single drop,
which then would be spread over three-fourths of the
egg's surface. In that light, we have come to realize
that the oceans, a vital life-preserving resource

93
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essential to

existence~

ar~

not inexhaustible.

1

Mankind is challenged to ma.."'<inlize the potential· of
ocean resources without evaporating them before viable
alternatives can be found to fossil fuels and other
diminishing reserves.

Such is the problem of man's struggle

-------------

,t:
~-=----

----- --- -

with his environment.
Supex•imposed upon this struggle is a second one, that
of conflicting interests among nations.

Eefore man can

intelligently deal with ocean resources he must first deal
with the international problems involved.

Thus, an inter-

h------- ---

national reg:i.me to distribute maritime wealth must depend
upon a relaxation of the struggle among nations before it can
ef:f'ectively obtain its primary goal of peacefully allocating
resources.

A method through which

f.J.

lessening of global

t;ens'ions might be achieved :i.s by affecting the political
compromises necessary to establishing a vJOrkable regime that
would be uni veJ.~sal in
procity.

~cope

and based on some form of reci-

Unless some form of progress is made toward

resolvlng the·environmental and international struggles
facing uS today the future may hold a host of undesirable .
l"epercussions.
Hoping to prevent conflict over ocean uses and
resources the United Nations is sponsoring the third Con:f'erence on the Law of the Sea.

rl'he Conference is scheduled

to begin substantive sessions on June 20, 1974 in Caracas,
1'l'homas A. Clingan, Jr., "Organizing to Probe the
Oceans; An. Exercise ln Political Science," Ore_gon _!.aw Review,
L (October, 1971), p. 398.

L:_---c--_

Venezuela.

The agenda for the Conference will be a long one,

some items are of minor i.mportance others could have the
impact of ttmaking or breaking'• the proposed ocean regime.
More important, ho\vever, than the specific i.tems of the agenda
are several key issues upon \-Jhich the Confer•ence
will hinge.

1

1

S

success

~-------~
~---

The context and significa.nce of: many of these

issues has already been discussed ln :the body of this thesis.
In the present discussion a summation of these issues is
attempted..

1'he more crucial issues wlll be presented here

and evaluated as to theil• overall impact upon the ocean
regime and the probability of their success at the coming IJaw
of the Sea Conference.
~or

Five major issues have been selected

discussion.
The first issue is the determination of the limits of

national jurisdiction.

Perhaps the most important issue, the

decision reached on the

quest~on

of national maritime boun-

daries will affect virtually every other phase and issue of
the conference.

The exact limits agreed upon at the Con-

ference, if any, will, in effect, directly determine the
amount of power an ocean regime will have.

The primary

reason for this is that in determining the extent of national
ocean boundaries one also allocates ocean resources.

It

should be recalled from the discussion in Chapter V that the
amount of ocean wealth is indirectly proportional to the
distance from the shore.
nation~

This is particularly true of

with long continental margins.

Although comprising only about 25 percent of the
world's total underwater terrain, theie margins are
of' irn.rilense significance, particularly the inne~

8- ---- -------
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regions of the shelves and slopes, for all coastai
and maritime interests~ Some 80 percent of all
commercial fish swim there. Nearly all potential
hydrocarbon resom~ces are loca.ted in margin deposits,
leaving only the nodules and highly migratory fish
as comrne2cially attractive r•esources beyond the
margins.
•
In addltion territorial and economic botmdaries will affect

0

.

,___ - - - - ---- - -- - -,.....,---

~------

·-······-···"·

milita~y-'-

scie11tific and commercial uses of the sea.···rrhese
-- ........

-.------·-.

problems are, however, more directly related to the second
issue which will be analyzed later.
Actual proposals that will certainly be presented at
the Conference range from territorial limits of from 12 to
200 miles.

':(.lhe 200-mile limit with full sovereign control

by the coastal state is being pushed the hardest by several
Latin .American states.

They are not alone, however, and have

been joined by both developed and developing nations who
favor the 200-mile limit.

The Soviet Union, on the other

hand, is proposing a 12 mile limit with an extended economic
zone for minerals of the continental margin.
The Soviet Union is proposing that coastal states
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over mineral resources
.out to the point where their margins reach depths of'
500 meters or out to 100 miles, whichever is greater.
This solution favors countries with wide, relatively
shallo\oJ margins--like the Soviet Union, whose margin
area extends outt..Jard many hundreds of miles--but still
leaves some margin resources around the world outside
the exclusive control o~ coastal states.J
The United States favors a 12 mile limit, if free transit is
-------

----

guaranteed, and an economic resource area that could extend
=

t·-

2

Seyom Brown and Larry L. Fabian, "Diplomats at Sea,"
roreign Affairs, LII (January, 1974), P• 303o

3
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Brown, p. 307.
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to 200 miles from shore.

There are, of course, almost as

many different suggestions as there are natiCons, however it
seems clear that some extension of coastal jurisdiction is
:;;::;;--~

imminento

----_

----~--~

F'

F~-~

It is this au thor's vi€rtoJ that, if an

~agreement

is

~

reached on the limits of national jurisdiction, it will
involve some system of graduated jurisdiction.,

That is, .a

system of gradually lessening coastal state "Control.
new territorial limit of at least 12

miles~

~ith

That a

full

sovereign rights for the coastal state, will emerge is almost
certain.

Beyond 12 miles there is likely to be established

an economic zone of 200 miles from the coast.

Within this

economic zone many different combinations o:r coastal state
control are possible.

These varying possibilities offer the

flexibility that is required for the necessary compromises
among nations before an agree!)lent can .be reached.
The second issue for discussion is the question of
exact coastal state control over their territorial and
economic waters.

This topic pal'tially assumes the outcome

of the first issue of national jurisdiction.

In other words,

everyone is expecting coastal claims to expand, probably to
a distance of 200 miles, but what type of control inside
\>Ihich distances has become critical.

For example, different

distances may well be claimed only for speciric resources
-~

the coastal state wishes to protect.

For oi1 ill the con-

tinental shelf a relatively narrow band would suffice, to
protect fishing rights a broader limit
·seems adequate.

ap~roa.ching

200 miles

While to lay claim to manganese nodules

IL

~

~-~

_
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beyond the continental margin even greater distances would be
required.

In addition to the problems presented by ocean
~-----

resources, which have already been discussed at length, other
uses of the sea further complicate the issue under examination.

~-----

~
;;,;;;-_-----
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One of the most illusive problems related to addi-

~

~-----=-

tional uses of the sea is that of military use which includes
spying.

While clearly a motivating factor to the major

industrialized states, military uses of the ocean as a reason
to form ocean policy can hardly be persuasive to the world
community particularly in light of the rhetoric surrounding

~~----

international ocean debate.

Almost all references to this

topic carry the phrase "peaceful uses of the ocean •••• "

As

a result maritime powers have been insisting that"other
legitimate uses 11 of the ocean be recognized within the wider
coastal state boundaries.

Such ambiguity adds an atmosphere

of uncertainty·to the question of traditional military
operations in coastal state waters.
Also related to military use of the oceans but of
vital concern to commercial interests as well is the question
of international straits which would become "closed" by a
12-mile territorial sea.

With a 12-mile limit most straits

in the world, with a vJidth of 24-miles or less, would become
territorial waters and therefore subject to additional
coastal state controls.

The United States, Soviet Union,

United ru.ngdom and other major developed states are highly
concerned about any additional control over international
straits.

On the other hand, several other states point to

the doctr1.ne of innocent passage and maintain that the new

-----
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limit will not cause

B.

hindrance to free transit through

formally international straits.
- - -

The use of ocean space for scientific research has

~·

,......,---~-

recently become a very controversial and political issue.
\Vhile major developed states, mostly those sponsoring the
oceanographic research, point to the traditional concepts of
freedom of the sea and freedom of scientific research, many
developing states are demanding a change.

Angered by

developed states' abuse of the freedom of scientific research
principle (the Pueblo incident, for examplel<t developing
states are beginning to question the principle 1 s legi tirnacy o
They argue that the information gained by oceanographic
research only benefits developed nations often at the expense
of the have-not countries.
A final problem related to the present issue of

juris diet ional ·control is the que.stion of pollution and it s
prevention.

Some countries are suggesting that coastal

states be given the complete responsibility for the creation
of pollution standards.
national standards.

Other states are opting for inter-

Similarly, some nations favor coastal

state enforcement of pollution standards, while others suggest
that this function should be performed by an international
body.
The eventual agreements made at the Conference
related to the jurisdLctional controls of coastal states are
difficult to predict.

However, several things seem probable.

Exact military uses of the sea are likely __:!:;o be dealt with' by
not dealing with them.a.t all or by some vague reference to

- - - -
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"other legitimate uses" upon wh1.ch maritime powers will
derive their justification for military operations.

Although

most international straits will probably become territorial
straits due to the 12-mile limit, there will almost certainly

,_,

~=-::-=-=---------=--=-=-!:2~-=----_:-::~

be a guarantee of free passage with minimal coastal state
restrictions.

·'-'--~

---

On scientific uses developing states are

likely to hold their ground demanding and probably getting,
an agreement for coastal state permission and possibly even
participat1.on before oceanographic expeditions are permitted
near their coasts.

'11he pollution question is not likely to

r:

- - - -

be given much attention or consideration unless it becomes the
means to a compromise on other, mor•e deeply felt, issues.
What kind of regime will the Conference on the Law of
the Sea establish?.'
any be established?

An even more fundamental question is, will
These questions have received

able attention ·since 1967.

consider~

Almost everyone agrees that a

regime should be established, almost no one agrees on what
kind.

Basically there are four different categories of

powers and functions which the regime could ass,xme. _They are
gathering information, registration of ocean activities,
licensing ocean activities, and direct exploitation of sea
resources.
There have been a number of draft proposals submitted
by various nations to "establish an international oceari
regime beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."

The

wording above demonstrates the importance that issue number
one on national jurisdiction has in relation to the regime.
- - - -

Obviously, if the regime functions only beyond the limits of
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national jurisdiction and those 11.mits are s:et at approximately 200 miles from shore there will be little for a Tegime
l==;----

to do.

This reality

~aises

the question of the possibility

,.....,--~

~----

of some regime control \vi thin coastal economic zones 1 as
----- ==_____ --_

R~-~~-----

suggested in the United States draft.

Additional questions

~--

~-----

related to the regime concern what form it will take and what
role it wili play in the settlement of dispu~tes.
The final-outcome at the Conference 'on the regime
question will depend heavily on current need f'or certain
ocean resources as well as their exploitabilityo

It seems

likely that the regime will be given the registration and
licensing powers described in Chapter VII.

However, it's

sphere of control will probably be outside of the coastal
state economic zones.

As a result the only :resources of

consequence that the regime may have some control over will
be the manganese nodules of the ocean floor..

Even this

possibility is tenuous •. If commercial exploitation of
nodules begins before a firm agreement is reached at the
Conference~the

whole idea of a regime could be scuttled.

Such an occurrence would indeed be disastrous since the
possibilities of conflict over rights to nodules would be
greatly increased.

At the very least the regime must provide

an international forum to mitigate conflict over ocean wealth
and provide for settlement of disputes.

~-----

Seyom Brown in a

recent article has underscored the importance of providing a
mechanism for the settlement of disputes.
Finally, procedures for settling disputes take
on special importance in today's ocean diplomacy
si.mply because the continuing pro11.feratlon of

~---=---=-----=-==-=-----
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ocean activities portends more disputes among more
countries over more issues than ever before.
•. • • The United States, not normally a friend of
compulsory international jurisdiction, anticipates
circumstances in which its nationals, especially lts
oil drillers and shippers, may be threatened by
unilaterally imposed coastal-state restrictions.
American negotiators now say that acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction is the cornerstone of new
arrangements being considered, and that most of
their own proposals for future ocean policy would
be absolutely unacceptable without compulsory
jL1risdiction. Thus the impression is conveyed that
compulsory jurisdictiop, like free transit, is a
non-negotiable demand.4
-

~---

~
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The fourth issue before the Conference is one raised
by the ideological phrase that the oceans and their wealth

are the ucommon heritage"· of all mankind.

Arvid Pardo, the

Ambassador from Malta, used this phrase in his now famous
declaration before the General Assembly.
It is, therefore, considered that the time has
come to declare the sea-bed and the ocean floor a
common heritage of mankind and that immediate steps
should be taken to draft a treaty embgdying, .,!~
~~~ the following principles~ • • •
.
The r-9.thev obvious implication of common heritage is that
nations should peacefully share in ocean uses and resources •
. The question on this issue is whether or not such talk is
real or

rhetorical~

There have been several draft proposals

submitted by various states that provide for a method of
redistribution of ocee.n resources to those developing nations
\'Jho do not possess the ca.pabili ties to exploit the oceans
themselves.

The principle of common heritage has been

universally accepted by the member nations of the United
-5

4srown, p. 313.

5

.

Padelford,

.

p~

290

-

--~-- .:_~-:-:.--=:::----:-::: ~--

103

Nations.
This author feels, however, that the ideological
principle of' common heritage wlll have little meaning at the
~

bargaining table of the upcoming Conference.

The developed

nations have already voiced their objections to
preta.tions" of the common heritage idea.

11

misinter-

--------------

~~

---

For example, John

Stevenson of the United States delegation to the Sea-bed
has stated:

Con~ittee

• • • the position taken by some delegations t-Ji th
which we have consistently disagreed, that 11 commo~
heritage" means the "common property 19 of mankind.
Although common heritage has become pa1.. t of nearly every
draft proposal its meaning is as slippery as the interstate
co~nerce

clause of the United States Constitution.

John

Frohnmayer has noted:
'

Stirring I•hetoric such as "the Seas are the
heritage of all mankind" is being recognized as meaning
whatever the country using it desires it to mean.
Since the current W1Certainty of the law of the sea-bed
:favors the developed countries with technology and
capital, underdeveloped nations have chosen a statemate as preferable to continued lack of controls.
If a plan of redistribution comes from June 1 s

Conference, it

l-Jill probably be token in nature rather than a genuine attempt
to practice a philosophy o:f common heritage.

A more signifi-

cant question is, what amount of tokenism, if any, will the
developing nations accept?
their demands?
next and final

6

How stubbornly will they stick to

------

These questions strike at the heart of the
issue~

Th~_pepartment

of State Bulletin, LXVII, p. 384.

7 Frohnmayer, p. 604.

-----

i
10[~

The final issue for discussion is that of the
Conference's impact upon the growing international struggle
between North,,and Sou-th.

The upcoming Conference of the LavJ

of the Sea has in many respects given focus to increasing

tensions betvwen the have and the have ... not nations.

Seyom

~- -------- ---------

=-----

Brown has corn..rnented::
The ocean bargaini~g now underway features and
reinforces some of the patterns of international politics emerging in the world at large. We 8.re referring
pa.rticularly to the disintegration of the cold-vJa.r
coalitions, the relative rlse of non-securlty issues,
the diversification of friendship and e..dversa.ry ..
·relations, and the embitterlng tension betHeen the
have and the have-not peoples. 8
Ocean debate, culminating in this year's Conference,
is a major and direct confrontation of the Hor·th-South
struggle.

The Conference's real significance _will be more in

the patterns of behavior est·ablished between North and South
than in the specific allocat.ion of ocean resources.
principles will characterize this struggle?
National self-interest?

\-rhat

Compromise?

It may not be logical to assume that

the same modes of behavior that he.ve characterized the East"
West conflict will also apply to a new North-South confrontation.

There is considerable evidence that developing

nations, at least on the sea regime issue, may not be willing
to·· compromise for something less than what they want, even
-------

though the result of their stubbornness will hurt them far
more than the developed countries.

Such irrational behavior

undermines' traditional concepts of national-self interest.

8

Bro\o1n, p. 313.

------
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Another important

facto~

in the opposition between

the have and have-not nations is the role that the People's
<=----

Republic of China will play.

Already working hard to
l i. - - : - - - - - ,

establish itself as the leader of the Third World, China may
well emerge from the Conference as the bastion of hope for

c __ ----------

the developing countries.
The developed·nations may be paying a higher price
£or ocean resoLtrces than they have figured..
industrialized states divide oc·ean

w~alth

If the

among themselves,

excluding the developing countries, the result may be an

r-:

------

embittered era in international relations--a new era with new
divisions and alliances. playing an old game of polarization
and confl1.ct.
Man is'a unique

I

ani~al.

He has the intellectual

capacity to substantially alter his envirorunent.

However, it

has become questionable l-1hether he can also adapt to the
environment that he has himself transformedo

Wolfgang

Friedmann has expressed this concern inhis book The Future

----·

··=-·-~

of the
-·

Oceans::

The tragedy of mankind may prove to be the
to adapt its modes of behavior to the products
intellect. Twentieth~century man threatens to
new kind of dinosaur, an animal ~uffering from
ill-adjusted to its environmento'7
9

inability
of its
be a
a brain

~
- - -

Friedmann, p. 120.
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APPENDIX A
PETROLEUM
r=

--------------

WORLD PROVED RESERVES (IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)*

*Harry

Ji1er et a1., ed. Comm9.dity Year Book_ _;197,l
(New York: Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., 1973), p. 257 o
-----

APPENDIX. B
PRIMARY METAL TO BE RECOVERED FROM NODULES TO

EXTENT

.

OF

.

. *

TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION IN 1967

Pounds
per ton

1967 world productlo:g_

Metal

of
~~~--~__godules

Manganes~~

100(%)

18,650,000 short tons ore

Manganese

Percentage of 1967 world production
o~ associated metals that would be
made available simultaneously
_Q_Qpper

.4{%}.

Nickel

Cobalt

59(%) 4.53(%)

Copper

11,184,377,000 pounds

15

2,502

100

1:~479

11,33.5

Nickel

1,007,943,000 pounds

20

169

8

100

766

Cobalt

32, 89 0, 000 po U..."lds

13

100

5·

*Elaine

H. Burnell and Piers von Simson, (eds.)
Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1970), Pe 3o
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APPENDIX C
TONS OF NODULES . AND B01'TOM AREAS TO BE HARVESTED

EACH YEAR TO YIELD METALS AT THE 1967
LEVEL OF PRODUC'riON FROM LAND

Metal
l"ianganese

SOURCES~}

Pounds
per ton
of
Nodules

1967 world production
18,650,000 short tons ore

Short
tons of
nodules
required

Area to be
harvested
sq. miles

29,8001000

1,069

Fraction of
total deep
ocean bottom
area
0.0008(%)

Copper

11,184,377,000 pounds

15

745,625,100

26,746

0.0192

Nickel

1,007,943,000 pounds

20

50,397,150

1,808

0.0013

Cobalt

32,890,000 pounds

5

6,578,000

236

*Elaine H. Burnell and Piers von Simson, (eds.)
Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1970), p. 3·
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APPENDIX D

VALUE OF WORLD PRODUCTION OF

NODUT~

METAL

1972 PRODUCTION

Manganese

22,42.5, 000 short ton.s

METALS AT 1972 PRICES*

MARKET PRI.CE

VALUE

$30.00 per ton··

$. 672,7.50,000
:..:

Copper

14,200,000,000 pounds

Nickel

1,417,000,000 pounds

Cobalt

52,900,000 pounds

.52

per pound

$ 1.40 per pound.

$ 2.45 per pound

Jiler e~ al., ed.
Research Bureau, Inc., 1973), p.

1,983,800~000

129,605,000

$10' 170, 1_5_5:, 000

T O'rAL VALUE

*Harry

7~384,000,000

,.

Commodity Year Book 197l (New York: Commodity
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